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FOR JOSEPH WEBB MCKNIGHT, HISTORIAN AND WRITER
OF LEGISLATION.
HESE two of my colleague's many illustrious roles inspired this
effort to record a history of business legislation in Texas.
This selective survey focuses on four periods in Texas history:
early (1830s-1840s), middle (late 19th-early 20th century) and later
(1950s-1980s and 1980s-2001) . It concentrates on corporate, partnership
and securities aspects of business and commercial law, and treats inciden-
tally some related aspects that were important in particular periods.
Business and commercial law in Texas has been made primarily in two
places: the Legislature and the law offices. The courts have had a lesser
role in making it, though they have had some role in unmaking it. So,
little will be said about the courts. What goes on in law offices is hard to
trace, especially in past periods, so relatively little will be said about that.
This leaves constitutions and statutes as our principal subject.
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1. AN AGRICULTURAL, SPARSELY SETTLED LAND
BECOMES A REPUBLIC, THEN A STATE, AND APPROACHES
BUSINESS WITH A MIXTURE OF HOSTILITY, CAUTION AND
AMBITION (1830s-1840s)'
With a struggle for independence achieved in 1836 there is little com-
mercial activity except farming and ranching. The businesses that exist
are mostly one-owner operations. There is not much need for large pools
of capital except for public or quasi public works.
The case law of the period is overwhelmingly procedural. Apart from
some land transactions and some promissory notes, business matters and
business organizations are conspicuously absent from the early court
reports. 2
1. In 1836, Texas population was probably 35,000 to 50,000. Later population figures
are given in n. 37 below.
2. This statement is based on a review of 1 Dallam, containing Texas Supreme Court
cases from 1840 to 1844.
TWO CENTURIES OF DEVELOPMENT
1.1 BANKING AND MONEY
Texas shared the hostility to banks and paper money-particularly pa-
per money issued by private banks, i.e. promissory notes theoretically
payable in hard money (gold or silver)-that was characteristic of this
period of hard money scarcity and paper money proliferation and fluctua-
tion. The hostility was most manifest in President Andrew Jackson's veto
of the extension of the Second Bank of the United States in 1832. The
hostility intensified in the panic of 1837 when all banks in the U.S. sus-
pended payment in hard money on their paper money circulating notes
and more than 600 banks failed.3 So it is no surprise that the Texas Con-
stitution of 1845 proclaimed: "No corporate body shall hereafter be cre-
ated, renewed or extended, with banking or discounting privileges ' 4 and
"The Legislature shall prohibit by law individuals from issuing bills,
checks, promissory notes or other paper to circulate as money."'5 The
Legislature solicitously carried out this hard currency, anti bank mandate
with increasingly severe sanctions, 6 All Gammel citations are to bottom
page numbers. and the Attorney General enforced them against at least
one leading citizen.7
3. See, e.g., R. MCGRANE, THE PANIC OF 1837, SOME FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE
JACKSONIAN ERA (1924).
4. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 30 (1845). The same language is in Tex. Const. art. VII § 30
(1861) and Tex. Const. art. VII § 30 (1866).
5. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 32 (1836). The same language appears in Tex. Const. art.
VII, § 32 (1861) and Tex. Const. art. VII, § 32 (1866).
6. Act of Dec. 14, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1389 (1898) (prohibiting
issuance of printed or lithographed notes by individuals or corporations; $5-$50 fine); Act
of Feb. 5, 1844, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1031 (1898) (suppression of private bank-
ing: repeal of all prior authorizations to issue bills and notes to circulate as money; $500
fine, 2-13 months prison); Act of Apr. 7, 1846, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1359 (1898)
(prohibiting issuance of notes by individuals to circulate as money; $10-$50 fine for each
note); Act of Mar. 20, 1848, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 234 (1898) (suppression of
illegal banking; prohibiting issuance of notes by corporations, companies, and associations
to circulate as money; prohibiting banking or discounting privileges without authority of
law; $2,000-$5,000 fine; officers personally liable if not paid; each month, each note a sepa-
rate offense). A prosecution under the 1848 Act is discussed in n. 7 below and accompany-
ing text.
7. Criminal fines were affirmed against Samuel M. Williams, one of Stephen F. Aus-
tin's principal aides in the colonization of Texas. Williams v. State, 23 Tex. 264 (1859), a
prosecution under the 1848 Act cited in n. 6 above. Williams circulated $1 demand notes of
The Commercial and Agricultural Bank at Galveston, of which he was president. He
claimed they were legal by virtue of Decree No. 308 of Apr. 30, 1835, J. KIMBALL, LAWS
AND DECREES OF THE STATE OF COAHUILA AND TEXAS 296 (1839), establishing the Bank.
The court found, in effect, that conditions precedent to the corporate existence of the bank
were not satisfied-and therefore no rights to issue notes vested-before private banking
was suppressed by the 1844 Act cited in n. 6 above. The conditions included subscription
(properly secured by real estate) for 3,000 shares of $100, collection of $100,000, and some
kind of commissioner's report. The court reinforced its view that there were conditions
precedent to the creation of the bank by noting the passive and instrumental language of
the decree: "It is hereby granted, that a bank be established.... Samuel M. Williams, as
empresario, shall take the proper measures for the establishment thereof." 23 Tex. 283.
This did not constitute Williams a corporation or "corporator" but only gave him authority
to take steps to form a corporation. Later corporate charters were more explicit in their
granting language, although there were variations as noted below.
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Negotiable instruments were recognized by common law. Legislation
made protest and notice of nonpayment unnecessary and allowed an as-
signee of a nonnegotiable instrument to sue on it.8
1.2 CORPORATIONS
Nonbanking corporations were regarded with somewhat less hostility
than banks. But they were viewed with suspicion as having power and
privilege inconsistent with egalitarian principles. 9 So their creation and
regulation were tightly reserved to the Legislature by the early Constitu-
tions from 1845 to 1866. Moreover, these Constitutions kept corporations
on a leash after they were created: "No private corporation shall be cre-
ated unless the bill creating it shall be passed by two thirds of both
Houses of the Legislature; and two thirds of the Legislature shall have
power to revoke and repeal all private corporations by making compen-
sation for their franchises."' 0 Thus one did not simply file articles of in-
corporation with a state official to create a corporation. One had to
persuade two thirds of each side of the Legislature to pass-and the Gov-
ernor to sign-a law creating the corporation.
Few private corporations"1 were created by the Legislature, and they
were mostly limited in purpose, capitalization, duration, and sometimes
in land ownership. (Land was, of course, the principal source of liveli-
hood and form of wealth.) Corporate structure, governance and opera-
tions were prescribed in considerable but highly variant detail. The
corporations were notably lacking in flexibility to modify any of those
attributes. A few were given authority to increase their capitalization
(within limits) or to renew their charters. Otherwise they could only re-
turn to the Legislature for amendment.
The capitalizations of some of the companies appear large, especially
when multiplied many times (perhaps 20 or more) to translate to present
dollars. But this is at least partly illusory since only a small fraction of the
capital (often 10%) had to be paid in before beginning operations. Stock
was typically sold on subscriptions payable in installments, and it seems
likely that many of the installments were never collected.
8. Act of Jan. 25, 1840, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 318 (1898). See also Act of
Mar. 20, 1848, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 187 (1898) (liability of drawer and accepter
may be fixed without protest and notice). The four pages on Negotiable Instruments in 0.
HARTLEY, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF TEXAS 770-74 (1850) contrast sharply with the 12
pages on Negroes, i.e. slavery, which follow, id. at 774-786.
9. See generally J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 13-57
(1970).
10. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 31 (1845). The same language appears in Tex. Const. art.
VII, § 31 (1861); Tex. Const. art. VII, § 31 (1866). The 1836 Constitution merely gave the
Legislature the power "to grant charters of incorporation." Tex. Const. art. II, § 3 (1836).
Some earlier charters explicitly reserved the right to buy back corporate franchises, e.g.
The Colorado Navigation Company, nn. 17- 18 below and accompanying text.
11. Incorporation of cities was common, e.g., Act of Dec. 14, 1937, 1 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 1379 (1898) (San Antonio).
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A number of the corporations were intended to develop infrastructure:
roads, canals, harbors, railroads. These commonly had explicit or implicit
monopoly and power of eminent domain. Tax and regulatory provisions
are sprinkled among the charters.
Some of today's familiar features are present in each of the early cor-
porations, but there is little consistency in the features the Legislature
gave them. One has proxy voting, another has quorum requirements, a
third prescribes the method of transfer of shares, a fourth has authority to
make bylaws, a fifth has stockholder inspection rights, a sixth has divi-
dend requirements and limitations. They rarely have the same duration
or renewal option. It's as though no drafter of a charter saw or read any
prior charter.
Nor is there consistency in the language the Legislature used to create
corporations. 12 But the language generally reflects the 19th century con-
cept that a corporation is a group of individuals and their successors with
certain collective powers and attributes. 13 This contrasts with the present
concept of a corporation as an independent entity with powers and attrib-
utes largely or wholly unrelated to individuals.
None of the early charters mention limited liability of shareholders,
which was apparently left to the uncertainties of the common law. 14
The first corporation to be chartered by the Republic of Texas was a
partial exception to the limitations just described: a grandiose conglomer-
ate. Two individuals in 1836 were "ordained, constituted, and declared to
be a body corporate and politic" by the name of The Texas Rail Road,
Navigation and Banking Company. The company had authority to con-
nect the Rio Grande and Sabine Rivers-the western and eastern bound-
aries of the present state, more than 400 miles apart at their nearest-by
means of internal navigation and railroads. And it had authority to exer-
cise banking privileges (including two bank branches with the possibility
of more by future legislation). 15 The pre-1836 Commercial and Agricul-
12. The importance of the creating language is exemplified by Williams v. State, 23
Tex. 264 (1859), discussed in n. 7 above.
13. Dean Hildebrand so noted while questioning-as late as 1942-whether there
could be a one man (i.e. one shareholder) corporation. 1 I. HILDEBRAND, LAW OF TEXAS
CORPORATIONS 160 (1942); see also id. at 22-23.
14. See, e.g., Walker v. Lewis, 49 Tex. 123 (1878) (charter provision that no stockholder
shall be liable for corporate debt for more than the amount of stock subscribed by him is
declaratory of the common law rule).
15. Act of Dec. 16, 1836, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1188 (1898). The constitu-
tional ban on banking was nine years in the future. The next railroad was the Galveston
and Brazos Railroad which also had turnpike powers and an authorized capital of $500,000
(5,000 shares of $100, of which $20 was to be paid on subscription). The charter would
forfeit if 10 miles of rail or turnpike were not completed in four years. Act of May 24, 1838,
1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1507 (1898).
There was at least one pre 1836 private "company" from the time Texas was part of
Mexico and the state of Coahuila and Texas. The Coahuila Manufacturing Co was created
for manufacturing cotton and woolen stuffs in Monclova. Governor's Decree No. 160 of
Oct. 1, 1830, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 277 (1898). It was to have "active capital" of
not more than $1,000,000 divided into 2,000 shares of $500, each with one vote. But, in
anticipation of some modern efforts to prevent takeovers, no person might have more than
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tural Bank is discussed in n. 7 above. The company was authorized to
raise capital of $5 million (50,000 shares of $100); this could be increased
to $10 million by paying the state a hefty $100,000 "bonus." Banking
could not start until the company had $1 million capital paid in specie
(hard money). There was a usury limit: 10% maximum interest on loans
and discounts. When the bank started operating, the company was to pay
$25,000 in gold or silver to the state, plus 2.5% of its net profits from
canals and railroads. If the $25,000 was not paid within 18 months, the
charter forfeited. The company's discounting (lending) was limited to
three times its paid in capital and the bills it issued (which could not be
smaller than $5) would bear interest at 10% if not redeemed in gold or
silver promptly on presentation. It was to give free transportation to gov-
ernment soldiers and munitions. The company had basic corporate pow-
ers, e.g., to sue and be sued, to own real and personal property, and-
significantly in those days-to have a seal. The company had the some-
what obscure "full power to borrow money upon the faith of this char-
ter." And it had the power of eminent domain for its canals and rail lines.
Its directors were authorized to make bylaws. It had continual succession
up to a 49 year life (subject to the forfeiture noted above), renewable for
another 49 years on payment of $500,000 in gold or silver plus 5% of net
profits from canals and railroads. An amount equal to 1% of the com-
pany's dividends was to be paid to the state. A government commis-
sioner was to report annually on the company. We've been unable to
learn what, if anything, became of this ambitious company.
The next few corporate charters were for colleges, without stock and
apparently nonprofit, but with no limitations on their duration. 16 They
were followed by business enterprises more modest than The Texas Rail
Road Navigation and Banking Company. The Legislature in 1837 "estab-
lished a company" (without designating individuals) named the Colorado
Navigation Company for "clearing out a channel susceptible of naviga-
tion by steam boats or other craft for the Colorado river."' 7 The Caney
Navigation Company was chartered on the same terms as the Colorado
Navigation Company except that its authorized capital was only $50,000.
Act of May 11, 1838, 1 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1478 (1898). Its au-
thorized capital was $125,000 (increasable to $250,000), divided into $100
50 votes, regardless of number of shares owned. Although that provision seems to impose
no limit on the number of shares a person could own, another section states that, after "the
company is established," a person could not increase his holding by more than one share.
After 1,000 shares were subscribed, the empresario (organizer) was to call a meeting to
elect a president and seven directors for one year terms. Only Mexicans could own shares.
Agents had to be bonded for faithful discharge of their duties, and the president and direc-
tors were personally liable for injury to the corporation from failing to have agents bonded.
A usury limit of 5% was set on loans made by the company. It had a 30 year duration and a
20 year exemption from taxes.
16. Act of June 5, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1295 (1898) (Independence
Academy and University of San Augustine; the trustees of each incorporated as "a body
politic"); Act of June 5, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1296 (1898) (Washington
College; the trustees incorporated as "a body corporate and politic").
17. Act of Dec. 14, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1371-75 (1898).
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shares. Commissioners were designated by name to open subscription
books at specified places for 20 days, to reduce the largest subscriptions
in a prescribed manner if the total exceeded $125,000, and to reopen the
books if the total was less than $125,000. 5% was to be paid at time of
subscription, and the rest on call of the company's directors but not more
than $25 a share (25%) at any one time. Directors could forfeit shares for
nonpayment of a call. Basic corporate powers, including the purchase and
sale of land, were granted. But land ownership was restricted in multiple
ways. The corporation could not "hold more land than may be necessary
to carry into effect the objects of this act;" "none of the funds of said
corporation shall be used in purchasing lands." But, somewhat inconsis-
tently, "all lands owned by the corporation shall be sold within five
years." (Similar restrictions persisted until 1981.) Five directors (each re-
quired to own at least five shares) were to be elected annually at Mata-
gorda by plurality of shareholders casting one vote per share, in person or
by proxy. The directors were to elect a president. There is a reference to
"rules and ordinances of this company" without specification whether
they were to be adopted by the shareholders or the directors. Work on
the river channel was to begin within nine months. If the channel was not
sufficient for steam boats 50 miles upriver from Matagorda in four years,
the charter would forfeit. If the channel was sufficient, the company could
set and charge tolls. But, in a mandate that foreshadowed later prohibi-
tions on price favoritism in transportation, tolls could be charged only
"upon terms of equality to all persons who may wish to navigate the
river." In a final restriction, the company was warned not to use any of its
capital "except for the removal of obstructions in the river and the navi-
gation of the same," on pain of forfeiture of its charter. Since nothing was
said about duration of the corporation, it was apparently perpetual, sub-
ject to the forfeitures already mentioned. A supplementary statute speci-
fied that the state could purchase or annul the charter, on completion of
the contemplated work, by paying the verified cost of the work plus
10%.18
Eight individuals were constituted "a body politic and corporate" in
1837 under the name The Texas Steam Mill Company "to operate by
steam power or otherwise a saw mill, a grist mill, a planeing mill, a lathe
and shingle mill, and any machinery necessary in carrying on such other
manufacturing or mechanical business as they shall determine to prose-
cute; also to prepare materials and erect public and private buildings,
stores and offices upon contract."'19 Similar were the Neches Steam Mill
Company ($20,000 capital, increasable to $50,000; 20 year life),20 and the
Bastrop Steam Mill Company ($10,000 capital, increasable to $25,000; 30
year life).21 The authorized capital was $30,000 actually paid in, which
18. Act of Dec. 27, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1453 (1898).
19. Act of Dec. 16, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1418 (1898).
20. Act of Dec. 21, 1838, 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 13 (1898).
21. Act of Dec. 24, 1838, 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 27 (1898).
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might be raised to $50,000 after the first year. The business was to be
managed by at least three directors, to be elected by shareholders for one
year terms. Directors were to elect a president, secretary and treasurer, to
fill vacancies among directors, call stock subscriptions in installments, and
to sell publicly stock on which calls were not paid. Quorums were set at a
majority for directors and a majority of those present for stockholders.
Stockholders had one vote per share, and the right to inspect the com-
pany's books of account. The directors were to order a statement of ac-
counts "as often as once a year." Stock was personal property,
transferable only on the company books. The company had a lien on
stock for a holder's debt to the company. The company was given a 10
year life.
The first insurance company dates from 1837. Nine individuals were
"incorporated and created a body politic and corporate" named The Bra-
zoria Insurance Company to write marine and fire insurance.22 The com-
pany was further broadly authorized to buy and sell real and personal
property, lend money at interest of 10% or less, and "do all those things
which an individual citizen may do in conformity with the law"-but not
to engage in banking or circulate notes of the character of bank bills. The
authorized capital was $200,000 (2,000 shares of $100),23 to be paid in
installments on call of the directors. Directors could forfeit shares for
nonpayment of a call. All the shares had to be subscribed, and 10% paid
in, before business began. Shares were transferable according to rules
made by the president and directors. The nine named individuals were
designated as initial directors. Nine directors were to be elected on the
first Monday of each January by shareholders who had held their shares
for three months. Proxy voting was permitted. The directors were to elect
a president. Three directors were a quorum. The directors every six or 12
months were to pay the shareholders a dividend of so much of the profits
"as in their discretion they shall deem safe and proper" and pay 1% of
that amount (or of the profits; the statute is not clear on this) to Brazoria
County for river improvements. The company was given a 30 year life.
As elsewhere in the U.S., railroads were eagerly sought as superior
means of transportation, especially for opening up areas for settlement
and for moving cattle and crops to markets. In addition to subsidies given
in specific corporate charters, an 1854 law granted railroads 16 sections of
land for each mile of railroad constructed.24
Given the importance of railroads, the sizable amount of capital
needed for their construction, and the proliferation of locally promoted
short lines, it is not surprising that a considerable amount of corporate
law evolved from the railroads. The first approach to a codification of
22. Act of Dec. 18, 1837, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1422 (1898).
23. The authorized capital could be increased, by the president and directors with con-
sent of a majority of the stockholders, in an amount "not exceeding... five thousand dol-
lars" on payment of a bonus of $5,000 to Brazoria County. Since this makes no sense, the
first $5,000 may be a typographical error for $50,000 or a larger number.
24. Act of Jan. 30, 1854, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1455 (1898).
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corporate law was an 1853 statute applying to all railroads. Among other
things, it required a principal corporate office (at which process could be
served) and annual reports to the state,25 authorized legislative examina-
tion of the corporate books,2 6 and made directors personally liable for
corporate debts if they paid dividends which made the corporation insol-
vent.27 This was mixed with mandates for railroad operation, such as re-
quiring that freight cars be in front of passenger cars,2 8 and that
locomotives have (and use at specified times) steam whistles or 30 pound
bells. 29 An 1857 law called for the keeping of stock books at the principal
office, open to stockholder inspection, 30 the holding of directors' meet-
ings there,31 and the making of bylaws by a 2/3ds stockholder vote, with
proxy voting permitted. 32 A majority of the directors had to be Texas
residents. 33
1.3 PARTNERSHIPS
General partnerships, in which all partners were personally liable for
partnership obligations, were recognized as a matter of common law, and
apparently rather widely used. 34
The sole general statutory authorization for business organizations was
an elaborate 1846 provision for limited partnerships in any business ex-
cept banking or insurance.35 It was modeled on the law of Eastern
states36 and was probably prompted by local merchants' or manufactur-
ers' desire for Eastern financial backing that was not available as straight
loans. The Act provided the only widely available protection from per-
sonal liability. Only special partners (as limited partners were called) en-
joyed the protection. General partners (and there had to be at least one)
were personally liable for partnership debts. But the special partners'
protection was fragile by modern standards and the required organiza-
tional structure was rigid. Contributions had to be paid in cash and could
not be withdrawn until dissolution. (This reflected a common 19th cen-
tury idea that capital was something fixed rather than money to be spent
or invested.) Interest could be paid special partners on their contributions
so long as the original contributions remained intact as capital of the firm.
Profits (if any remained after payment of interest) could be paid special
25. Act of Feb. 7, 1853, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS, at §§ 4, 13 1339 (1898).
26. Id. § 23.
27. Id. § 2.
28. Id. § 12.
29. Id. § 13.
30. Act of Dec. 19, 1857, 4 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS at § 2 897 (1898).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 4.
33. Id. § 3.
34. See, e.g., McKinney & Williams v Bradbury, Dallam 441 (Tex. 1841); Crozier, Rhea
& Co. v. Kirker, 4 Tex. 252, (1849); Eakin v. Shumaker, 12 Tex. 51 (1854); Saunders v.
Duval's Adm'r, 19 Tex. 407 (1857).
35. Act of May 12, 1846, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1585 (1898).
36. Although there are differences in language and arrangement, the Texas statute is
very close in substance to the first U.S. limited partnership statute, 1822 N.Y. Laws 259-61.
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partners subject to the same restriction. Filing a certificate with the
county clerk and six weeks publication of its terms were required to form
a limited partnership. Any falsity in the certificate made special partners
liable as general partners for the partnership's engagements. Any change
in business, capital, or partners' names or shares dissolved the limited
partnership and converted it to a general partnership (with special part-
ners liable as general partners) unless it was refiled and republished with
the new terms. Any continuation beyond the term of existence specified
in the certificate similarly converted the firm to a general partnership un-
less it was refiled and republished with a new term. Four weeks published
notice was required for voluntary dissolution. Special partners could "ex-
amine into the state and progress of the partnership concerns
and. . .advise as to their management." But only the general partners
were authorized to transact business for the firm. They were accountable
to each other and to the limited partners in law and equity. Suits relating
to the partnership business could be brought by or against the general
partners as if there were no special partners. Preferential transfers in or in
anticipation of insolvency were declared void; the sanctions included gen-
eral partner liability for a violating special partner.
1.4 BANKRUPTCY
Many early Texas settlers are thought to have come, at least partly, to
escape their creditors farther North and East. So it is not surprising to
find a tradition of debtor protection. An 1841 bankruptcy law imple-
mented the tradition, allowing generous exemptions (including a 50 acre
homestead) and discharge from further liability.37 The tradition was
somewhat at odds with the creditor protecting pressures for personal lia-
bility reflected in the strict limited partnership law and in the difficulties
of obtaining a corporate charter. The bankruptcy law served as a safety
valve.
1.5 SECURITIES
There was no securities law in the modern sense. There were only lim-
its, set in individual charters, on the amounts of securities that corpora-
tions could issue.
37. Act of Jan. 19, 1841, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 502 (1898). The 50 acre (or
$500 town lot) homestead had been defined and sheltered from creditors in Act of Jan. 26,
1839, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 125 (1898). The homestead was expanded to 200
acres (or $5,000 town lot) in Act of Aug. 15, 1870, 6 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 301
(1898). Even earlier, before the Republic of Texas, lands acquired under colonization laws
were not subject to payment of prior debts, and colonists were not to be sued on prior
debts until they had held their lands 12 years. Act of Jan. 13, 1829, Congress of the State of
Coahuila and Texas, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 220 (1898).
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2. A GROWING STATE ENCOURAGES SOME ASPECTS OF
BUSINESS AND REJECTS OTHERS (1860s-1910s)
Moving past joining the U.S. in 1845 and the Civil War, we consider
only a few of the legal developments in this period of rapid expansion of
farming and ranching after the Reconstruction Era, gradual expansion of
finance and industry, steady growth of rail and road communication, 38
relatively fast urbanization and population growth,39 and sudden intensi-
fication after the Spindletop oil discovery in 1901.
2.1 BANKING
The constitutional prohibition on incorporated banks continued from
1845 through 1904 except for a brief hiatus in 1869-1876.40 Private unin-

















Source, Texas Almanac 544 (1978-79); Id. 604 (2000-2001) (operated mileage for 1980 and
later).
39. See generally, J. SPRATr, THE ROAD TO SPINDLETOP: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN



















Source: Texas Almanac 338 (1984-85); Id. 285 (2000-2001) *(182,921 slaves of total
604,215).
40. Tex. Const. art. 16, § 16 (1876); earlier provisions are cited supra n.4 above. A.
Thomas & A. Thomas, Interpretive Commentary, 3 Tex. Const. 171-73 (Vernon 1955); Mc-
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corporated banks, often offshoots of mercantile firms, in varying degrees
supplied the need for deposit, credit and payment facilities. The prohibi-
tion finally ended in 1904 when the Legislature was empowered by the
Constitution to authorize incorporation of banks by general laws rather
than by legislative charter. All banks' authorized capital had to be sub-
scribed and paid in full in cash, and they were not to engage in business at
more than one place, i.e. no branch banking.41 The Legislature passed the
first general incorporation law for banks in 190542 and many banks were
formed. The ban on branch banking, though circumvented in many ways,
has remained a controversial part of Texas law until 1986 when the Legis-
lature was permitted to relax it.43 Federal law in 1864-65 provided for the
creation of national banks and virtually eliminated paper money issued
by state banks.
2.2 CORPORATIONS
In 1874 Texas joined the trend toward business incorporation by gen-
eral law, i.e. by filing incorporation documents with a state official rather
than by having the Legislature enact a special statute for each corpora-
tion. The trend began in the U.S. almost a century earlier and became
widespread in the later 1800s.44 Two factors contributed to the trend.
One was recognition of the utility of the business corporation as a capital
gathering device to finance large scale, capital intensive enterprise, and of
the importance of ready availability of the device. The other factor was
recognition of the potential-all too often realized-for corruption and
bribery in the legislative grant of special charters.
Efforts to shift to incorporation by general laws began in 1871 with
Democratic prodding of the Republican controlled Legislature. The 1869
Reconstruction Constitution then in force said nothing about corpora-
tions and thus would have permitted general incorporation statutes. But
the first two efforts failed because of ineptitude or, as the Democrats
charged, from sabotage. 45 The first bill lacked an enacting clause. 46 The
second purported to but did not reenact the first.47 Only the third, after
Knight, Tracings of Texas Legal History: Breaking Ties and Borrowing Traditions, CENTEN-
NIAL HISTORY OF THE TEXAS BAR 1882-1982 at 264 (1981).
41. Tex. Const. art. 16, § 16 (as amended 1904).
42. 1905 Tex. Laws 489.
43. Tex. Const. art. 16 § 16 (as amended Nov. 4, 1986): "Except as may be permitted
by the Legislature ... a state bank shall not be authorized to engage in business at more
than one place which shall be designated in its charter." The amendment was implemented,
in convoluted fashion, by 1985 Tex. Laws 2d C.S. ch. 13 § 1, later TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 342-903 (Vernon Supp. 1993), finally repealed by 1995 Tex. Laws ch. 914 § 26(1).
44. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 25-26 (3d ed. 1983) and ref-
erences there. The Texas Law was modeled on Kansas's, according to Ramsey v. Tod, 69
S.W. 135 (1902).
45. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, INTERPRETIVE COMMENTARY, 2 Tex. Const. 705-05
(Vernon 1955).
46. Act of Dec. 2, 1871, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 68 (1898).
47. Act of Apr. 23, 1873, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 494 (1898).
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Democrats gained control of the Legislature, was properly passed. 48
The 1876 Constitution confirmed that "No private corporation shall be
created except by general laws" 49 and added that the laws should "pro-
vide fully for the adequate protection of the public and of the individual
stockholders. '50 The Constitution specifically mandated one form of that
protection by outlawing watered stock (and bonds): "No corporation
shall issue stock or bonds except for money paid, labor done or property
actually received, and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall
be void."'51
The 1874 Act divided private corporations into three kinds: religious,
charitable, and "for profit." Listing profit corporations last suggests they
were still not very important or desirable in the minds of the legislators.
Corporations could be created under the 1874 Act only for a limited
list of 27 designated purposes or groups of purposes.5 2 The first listed
purposes were religious or charitable. Many of the rest were for quasi
public improvements: bridges, ferries, stage coach lines, sewers, water
and gas supply, etc. Fewer than half were for businesses now regarded as
typically private: land subdivision and sale, printing and publishing, build-
ing construction, hotel establishment and maintenance, "the transporta-
tion of goods, wares and merchandise or any valuable thing," and "the
transaction of any manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical busi-
ness."'53 The statute preceded the list of purposes with the language "The
purposes for which corporations... may be formed are."'54 It did not say
that a corporation could be organized only for one of the designated pur-
poses or groups of purposes, but the courts so construed it, relying on the
section of the statute specifying that the charter should set forth "the pur-
pose" 55 for which the corporation was formed.56
Finally a corporation could be organized for "any other purpose in-
tended for mutual profit or benefit not otherwise especially provided for,
and not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this State." This
uncharacteristically broad language was broadly interpreted to allow a
corporation for buying and selling real estate, livestock, bonds, securities
and other properties for its own account and for commission.57 Presuma-
bly the language would have permitted almost any other purpose. But it
had disappeared from the statute books by 1895.58 However, successive
48. Act of Apr. 23, 1874, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 122 (1898) (hereafter "1874
Act").
49. Tex. Const. art. 12, § 1 (1876).
50. Tex. Const. art. 12, § 2 (1876).
51. Tex. Const. art. 12, § 6 (1876).
52. 1874 Act § 5.
53. 1874 Act § 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ramsey v. Tod, 69 S.W. 135 (1902).
57. Nat'l Bank of Jefferson v. Texas Inv. Co., 12 S.W. 101 (1889).
58. It was omitted from 1895 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 130, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1242 (1898) which amended 1874 Act § 5 and was codified as TEX. REV. STAT. § 642
(1895). By this time the number of authorized purposes had increased to 55.
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amendments brought the list of permitted purposes from 27 to more than
100 (many of them multiple)59 before particular corporate purposes were
abandoned in 1955.
The distrust of corporations in 1874 was manifest in ways other than
their limited purposes. Their life was limited to 20 years. 60 And they were
prohibited from employing their "stock, means, assets, or other property,
directly or indirectly, for any other purpose whatever, than to accomplish
the legitimate objects of the creation."'61 Fundamental changes, such as
amendment of the charter or consolidation with another corporation, re-
quired unanimous consent of shareholders unless explicitly authorized by
statute.62 (This is another reflection of the concept of a corporation as a
group of individuals rather an independent entity.) Amendments had to
be "germain" to the corporation's purposes. Consolidation was author-
ized a decade later, apparently only for charitable corporations whose
charters had expired,63 but a similar provision was treated, without analy-
sis, as applicable to business corporations. 64 There was no provision for
merger of one corporation into another.
Basic corporate powers were granted by the 1874 Act: to sue and de-
fend, have a seal, buy and sell real and personal property, appoint and
remove officers and agents, make bylaws and contracts, change (by stock-
holder vote) the number of directors (between 3 and 13), and borrow
money (up to the amount of their capital stock).65
There was no limit on the amount of capital stock that could be speci-
fied in the charter, and no requirement that any particular proportion of
it be subscribed or paid in.66 "[W]e find no provision in the law making
the existence of the corporation dependent upon the subscription to its
stock or the payments therefore. ' 67 The latter was perceived to be too
liberal; 1897 and 1901 amendments required 50% subscription and 10%
pay-in before issuance of a charter;68 1907 amendments required 100%
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302 (Vernon 1945).
60. 1874 Act § 11.
61. 1874 Act § 23.
62. Bonnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 60 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) (dictum that funda-
mental change without statutory authorization is violation of contract rights of nonassent-
ing shareholder).
63. Act of Apr. 2, 1883, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 404 (1898).
64. Tex. Seed & Floral Co, v. Chicago Set & Seed Co, 187 S.W. 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1916, refused) (new corporation, issuing its shares to shareholders of two old
corporations which gratuitously transferred their assets to new corporation, was liable for
obligations of old corporation).
65. 1874 Act §§ 11, 13. Corporate conveyances of land could be recorded if signed by
the president, sealed and acknowledged. 1874 Act § 33. Corporate records were competent
evidence if signed by the president and secretary and sealed. 1874 Act § 34.
66. 1874 Act § 14 contemplates an indefinite time for keeping subscription books
open. Section 21 authorizes the directors to dispose of capital stock "at any time remaining
unsubscribed."
67. Nat'l Bank, 12 S.W. at 104.
68. Act of May 7, 1897, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1242 (1898); 1901 Tex. Gen.
Laws 18.
[Vol. 55
TWO CENTURIES OF DEVELOPMENT
subscription and 50% pay-in.69 Capital stock could be increased up to
double on majority stockholder vote. 70 Stock was personalty, transfera-
ble only on the corporate books in accordance with the bylaws. 71 Limited
liability was explicitly granted: a stockholder was not "liable to pay the
debts of the corporation beyond the amount unpaid on his stock."'72
Corporations could be formed by any three persons (including two
Texas citizens) filing with the Secretary of State a charter including name,
address, purpose, term, names and addresses of initial directors, amount
of capital stock, and number of shares.73 Corporations were required "to
commence active operations" within three years after filing their charters,
or their charters would forfeit.74
Directors were to be elected annually by stockholders, fill vacancies,
elect one of themselves president, elect other officers, transact the corpo-
rate business and manage its affairs, and collect its stock subscriptions; a
majority of the directors constituted a quorum. 75 Directors could make
bylaws but a majority vote of shareholders could change them.76 Direc-
tors were to keep books and records; stockholders were entitled to in-
spect them. On requirement of 1/3 of the stockholders, directors were to
present written reports "of the situation and amount of business of the
corporation, and declare and make such dividends of the profits from the
business of the corporation as they shall deem expedient, or as the bylaws
may prescribe. '77 If directors knowingly paid a dividend while the corpo-
ration was insolvent, or that would make it insolvent, they became per-
sonally liable-to the extent of the dividend-for existing corporate debts
and future debts contracted while they continued in office. 78
Special empowering and regulating provisions-reminiscent of the pre-
vious legislative charters-were added for nine particular kinds of com-
panies including macadam and plank roads, telegraphs, and cemeteries. 79
Foreign corporations were first required in 1887 to obtain a permit to
do business in Texas.80 But the law was unconstitutional because-in a
provision apparently copied from Iowa-it forfeited the permit of a cor-
poration which removed to federal court a suit filed against it in state
court.81 An 1889 law cured that defect.82
A great leap forward in the liberation of women occurred in 1887 when
women were allowed to be incorporators, officers, directors and share-
69. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 309.
70. 1874 Act § 12.
71. 1874 Act § 24.
72. 1874 Act § 41.
73. 1874 Act § 6.
74. 1874 Act § 36.
75. 1874 Act §§ 15, 16, 21, 25.
76. 1874 Act § 17.
77. 1874 Act § 21.
78. 1874 Act § 28.
79. 1874 Act §§ 42-81.
80. Act of Apr. 2, 1887, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 914 (1898).
81. Tex. Land & Mortgage Co. v. Worsham, 13 S.W. 384 (1890).
82. Act of Apr. 3, 1889, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1115 (1898).
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holders-but only of certain nonprofit corporations: charitable, educa-
tional, missionary, literary, scientific, library, painting, music and fine arts
but not churches.8 3
2.3 PARTNERSHIPS
There was no significant change in partnership law in this period. Busi-
ness trusts (also known as Massachusetts trusts), which had been rather
widely used-partly in hopes of avoiding federal corporate income tax-
were held to be partnerships so that beneficiaries were liable for debts of
the trust.8 4 The court stressed that limited liability in a noncorporate or-
ganization could be achieved only through the limited partnership
statutes.
2.4 BANKRUPTCY
Federal bankruptcy law preempted state law-as to discharge of debt-
ors from further liability-from 1898, although state law of fraudulent
conveyances and assignment for benefit of creditors survived.
2.5 ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
The Populist sentiment abroad in the land inspired Texas to adopt one
of the earliest antitrust laws a year before the federal Sherman Anti Trust
Act of 1890.85 The Texas Act defined a trust as a combination to restrict
trade, reduce production, prevent competition, or raise, lower or fix
prices. Without explicitly outlawing or prohibiting trusts, it prescribed va-
rious sanctions for them, including fines, prison sentences, voidness of
contracts and forfeiture of corporate charters.86 Much of this law is still
on the books.87 Even before the antitrust statute was enacted, Attorney
General James S. Hogg had obtained an injunction against the Texas Traf-
fic Association, an organization of nine railroads with contractual power
to set freight and passenger rates binding on the members. 88 The antitrust
laws were enforced with some vigor in this period. The most famous ex-
ample resulted in the Waters-Pierce Oil Company (a part of the Rocke-
feller controlled Standard Oil Company) paying a $1.8 million fine in
cash to the State. 89
Another Populist product was the Railroad Commission, created in
83. Act of Apr. 2, 1887, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 901 (1898). See generally
Amsler, The Status of Married Women in the Texas Business Association, 43 TEXAS L. REV.
669 (1965).
84. Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S.W. 554 (1925), noted 39 Harv. L. Rev. 276 (1925). See
generally Hildebrand, The Massachusetts Trust, 1 TEXAS L. REV. 127 (1923); Liability of the
Trustees, Property and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 TEXAS L. REV. 139 (1924);
Massachusetts Trust-a Sequel, 4 TEXAS L. REV. 57 (1925).
85. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
86. Act of Mar. 30, 1889, H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1169 (1898).
87. See Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code §§ 15.01-15.26.
88. Gulf C. S. & F. Ry. v. State, 10 S.W. 81 (1888).
89. Colorful accounts, complete with pictures of the payment, include Jackson, Waters-
Pierce Cases-Another Visit, 38 TEX. BAR J. 529 (1975); Wallace, Waters-Pierce Oil Corn-
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1891 under the leadership of Hogg who was then Governor.90 The Com-
mission was to regulate the railroads, by this time viewed as powerful and
corrupt, bloated with watered stock and bonds, badly managed and,
above all as gouging most shippers while giving rebates to some.91 The
Legislature charged the Commission particularly to prevent discrimina-
tion and extortion by the railroads, and to set reasonable freight and pas-
senger rates.92 The Commission survives today, although its far more
important function has become the regulation of oil and gas.
2.6 SECURITIES
Texas developed or attracted its share of those who sought to get rich
quick by appealing to others who sought to get rich quick through land,
oil, corporate stock or other interests. The greedy or crooked sold to the
greedy or gullible. We have already noted the constitutional prohibition
on watered stock and bonds.93 An 1893 statute that was narrowly focused
on railroads imposed a number of anti watering restrictions that suggest
the constitution was being widely ignored. A railroad's bonds each had to
be registered with the Secretary of State and were limited, in total, to the
value of the railroad's property or (with Railroad Commission permis-
sion) to 150% of that value. The Company secretary had to file with the
Railroad Commission for each stock certificate a statement that proper
consideration had been received for it. Total stock could not exceed the
value of the railway property.94
The state's first relatively broad "blue sky law" regulating sale of cor-
porate stock was enacted in 1913, according to its emergency clause, be-
cause "numerous corporations. . .are selling. . .stocks throughout this
State, many of which are worthless, and... the people of this State are
being imposed upon by unscrupulous persons selling such worthless
stocks."'95 Its main targets were apparently mineral, land and town site
companies. Principal abuses at which it aimed were excessive promotion
(free or cheap stock for the organizers) and excessive commissions (to
sellers). In passing the statute, Texas was following closely on the heels of
Midwest states, led by Kansas.96
The 1913 statute had rudiments of securities registration (with permits
issued on a vague fairness standard discretionarily applied), agent regis-
pany Case Revisited, 24 TEX. BAR J. 221 (1961); Sanford, Texas Million Dollar Anti-Trust
Suit, 11 TEX. BAR J. 167 (1948).
90. Family tradition has it that my grandfather, proprietor of I. G. Bromberg & Co.,
the general store of Mineola, Texas, sold Hogg-on credit-the suit in which he began
campaigning for election.
91. See generally J. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 104-42 (1961).
92. 1891 Tex. Laws ch. 51, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 55 (1898). The origins and
limited accomplishments of the Commission are discussed in J. SPRATF, THE ROAD TO
SPINDLETOP: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN TEXAS, 1875-1901 210-27 (1970).
93. See supra text accompanying note 49.
94. Act of Apr. 8, 1893, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 486 (1898).
95. 1912 Tex. Gen. Laws 66, 71.
96. 1911 Kan. Laws ch. 133 was the first relatively comprehensive securities statute.
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tration, exemptions, criminal and civil liability and other enforcement
mechanisms, fraud prevention and other investor protections which per-
sist today in greatly refined form. The paternalistic pattern of state deter-
mination of which securities investors may buy survived through most of
the 20w' century.
The statute was detailed but muddled. It applied-subject to exemp-
tions noted below-to existing corporations increasing their capital stock,
to proposed corporations selling stock and paying commissions (or pro-
motion), and, somewhat redundantly, to proposed corporations with land
or mineral assets, and to town site corporations. These corporations, or
their promoters, were to file with a state official (the Commissioner of
Insurance and Banking for corporations under his jurisdiction, the Secre-
tary of State for other corporations) a statement of their plans to sell
stock (including price, commissions and promotion) and to organize their
corporations. Land or mineral companies were to state the facts on which
they based their estimate of actual value of their assets. They were to
furnish other information necessary or proper concerning the sale of the
stock. The official could employ experts-presumably to verify value or
other information in the statements-at the expense of proposed corpo-
rations. The official could also examine a corporation's books and investi-
gate it at the corporation's expense. A town site company was to file its
town site plans and advertising and could not be chartered unless the
Secretary of State was satisfied that the business would be "honestly and
fairly conducted both to the corporation and to the public."
The official would issue a permit for the stock sale if he found that the
sale would be "fairly and honestly conducted" and the commissions and
expenses would not exceed 15%. Suit could be brought to compel issu-
ance of a permit if refused. The official could cancel a permit, after notice
and opportunity, for noncompliance with the statute. Suit could be
brought to reinstate. No standards are set out for either kind of suit.
Commissions and expenses were to be disclosed to prospective inves-
tors in the company's subscription lists and contracts. A surety bond of
$1,000 to $100,000 but not more than 10% of the proposed stock sale was
required, payable to the official, conditioned on truth of the statement
and sale of the stock in compliance with the statute. Buyers "by reason of
any misrepresentation of any material fact concerning such stock" could
sue on the bond. But no right to sue the seller is mentioned. Names and
addresses of all corporate officers, agents and employees were to be filed
with the official.
Companies were to keep records of their stock sales and stockholders.
Sale proceeds were to be deposited in a bank and refunded if a proposed
corporation was not organized in two years, unless the state official ex-
tended the time. Foreign corporations (except lenders and some insur-
ance companies) were denied permits unless their stock was at least 50%
subscribed and paid in. Foreign corporations were required to consent to
service of process. Selling or offering stock of a profit corporation with-
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out compliance with the statute could bring a fine of $25-$2,000 and one
year in jail.
Corporations exempt from the statute were national and Texas banks,
railroads, and interurban and street railways. The bank and railroad ex-
emptions probably reflect the lobbying power of those industries, al-
though the exemptions were undoubtedly rationalized on the ground of
extensive administrative regulation of the two industries. In view of the
boom and bust history of those industries, both before and after this pe-
riod, there is irony in their exemptions.
Transactions exempt from the statute were sales to 25 or fewer bona
fide buyers, resales by bona fide buyers not acting for the issuing corpora-
tion, and sales by bona fide stock brokers of stock previously bought by
bona fide buyers.
A 1919 statute created a powerful private cause of action for material
false representations and false promises in real estate transactions and-
apparently incidentally-stock transactions. 97 The victim could recover
the difference between the value as represented (or as if the promise had
been kept) and the value as delivered, i.e. benefit of the bargain damages.
All persons making or benefiting from the false representation or prom-
ise were jointly and severally liable. And those acting willfully or know-
ingly were liable for exemplary damages up to double the amount of
actual damages.
2.7 COMMERCIAL LAW
In the last decade of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th,
substantial efforts were made to codify commercial law and make it uni-
form across the U.S. Texas joined those efforts very slowly, adopting the
1896 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in 1919,98 the 1906 Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act in 1919, 99 the 1909 Uniform Stock Transfer Act
in 1943,100 and the 1933 Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 1959,101 and Texas
did not adopt a number of related uniform acts, such as bills of lading,
fraudulent conveyances and chattel mortgages.
97. 1919 Tex. Laws 77. The emergency clause refers only to land, reciting "that there
are now in this State a number of fraudulent land schemes, and that a great number of
citizens of this State have been defrauded thereby, and that there is now no comprehensive
law protecting [them] from being defrauded by false representations and promises." Id.
§ 4. In part the statute codified the common law of fraud. The present version is TEX. Bus.
& COMM. CODE art. 27.01.
98. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws 190.
99. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws 215.
100. 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 722.
101. 1959 Tex. Laws 652.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
3. A RAPIDLY EXPANDING AND INDUSTRIALIZING
ECONOMY FURTHER ENCOURAGES BUSINESS BUT
CONTINUES TO RESTRICT SOME ASPECTS (1950S-1980S)
The memory of East Texas oil prosperity is lost after the Depression.
World War II brings defense industry and mobilization. . Public owner-
ship of corporations spreads. In this and the next era we can identify
many of the persons and institutions responsible for changes in Texas law.
The rest of this article is somewhat fuller than the first part. But it is not a
detailed analysis or even a complete summary of every statute. Rather it
is an effort to identify significant stages and developments over a two-
decade span. More detailed accounts of legislation as well as case law for
this period can be found in the Annual Surveys of Texas Law from the
1970 on in the Southwestern Law Journal and SMU Law Review.
3.1 BANKING
While state banking law continues to exist, and to proliferate, °2 bank-
ing law was increasingly federal, administered by the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Comptroller
of the Currency. We make no attempt to cover it here. 10 3
3.2 CORPORATIONS
A major development in Texas business law was the Texas Business
Corporation Act of 1955 (TBCA), a comprehensive and relatively flexi-
ble statute filling many gaps in the 1874 Corporation law (and its succes-
sive amendments) and relieving many of the serious rigidities imposed by
that Law. These rigidities became increasingly burdensome as ownership
of corporate shares became widespread. Many of the shortcomings of
Texas corporate law had been noted by Dean Ira P. Hildebrand in his
1942 treatise. 104 Many were discovered by Prof. Edmund 0. Belsheim in
trying to teach Texas corporate law while visiting at Austin from Ne-
braska. His 1949 call for reform10 5 helped galvanize and guide the
reshapers of Texas corporate law. But the driving force was Paul Car-
rington of the Dallas Bar. He had served on the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee that revised the Model Business Corporation Act (which
was based on the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933). He per-
suaded the State Bar of Texas to form a Committee on Revision of Cor-
porate Laws in 1950 and was its chairman. Initial members were Adrian
F. Levy, Sr. of Galveston, Lewis Scott Wilkerson, Assistant Secretary of
State, and three professors: E. W. Bailey of the University of Texas, J.
Leon Lebowitz of Baylor, and Talbot Rain of Southern Methodist. Early
additions to the Committee included Peyton B. Randolph of Plainview
102. See generally TEX. FINANCE CODE §§ 31.001-59.310,
103. See, e.g., J. NORTON, BANKING LAW MANUAL ch. 3 (1983).
104. I. HILDEBRAND, THE LAW OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS (4 vols. 1942).
105. _ Belsheim, The Need for Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes, 27 TEXAS
L. REv. 659 (1949).
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and Prof. Margaret Amsler of Baylor. Working from the Model Act, the
Committee prepared and published an exposure draft and request for
comments in 1951,106 received numerous comments, and made responsive
modifications and refinements. These were given further public expo-
sure.107 The statute was introduced in the 1953 Legislature and reported
favorably-but loaded with 65 amendments-by a House Committee too
late in the session to be acted on.108 The primary point of controversy
was a proposal that a 2/3ds (rather than 4/5ths) vote of stockholders
would suffice for merger, consolidation, asset sale and dissolution.
With the addition of George Slover, Jr. of Dallas and Robert S. Trotti
of the Attorney General's Office to the Committee in 1953, some further
modifications were made and the statute passed with little further change
in 1955.109 Among highly important provisions differing from the 1874
Act, it authorized multiple corporate purposes,110 perpetual duration,"I
repurchases of a corporation's own shares,1 12 redemption of shares, 13
different classes of shares (including shares whose terms could be fixed by
directors),' 14 restrictions on share transfers,' 15 classification (staggering)
of directors,11 6 executive committees of directors,117 actions by unani-
mous shareholder consent without a meeting,'" 8 appraisal rights for
shareholders dissenting from mergers and certain other corporate ac-
tions, 119 and major actions on approval of directors and 4/5ths share-
holder vote: merger, consolidation, asset sales and dissolution. 120 The Act
106. 14 TEX. B. J. 219 (May 1951).
107. E.g., Symposium on the Proposed Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV.
405 (1952). One of the symposium articles traces the history of Texas corporate law and the
development of the proposed Act. Carrington, History of the Proposed Texas Business
Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 428 (1952).
108. A brief summary of the early development of the Act is Carrington, Revision of
Corporation Laws, 17 TEX. B. J. 381 (1954). The 1953 bill was H.B. 27, 53d Leg. Reg. Sess.
(1953). Files of the SMU members of the Committee from 1950 on are in the Underwood
Law Library at SMU.
109. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act (1955). The emergency clause, with the inimitable sweep of
Paul Carrington's style, refers to the incompleteness, inconsistency, and uncertainty of ex-
isting law; the need for clarification; the modern laws of other states; and the loss of Texas
enterprise and tax revenue because of incorporation in other states. Id. art. 11.01.
110. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.01 (1955). At the same time it did away with the re-
stricted list of statutory purposes which had grown to more than 100 by 1955. The 1955 Act
required purposes to be stated fully in the charter. Later amendment eliminated this re-
quirement and made it sufficient for the charter to state that a corporation was organized
"for the transaction of and all lawful business." Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 3.02A(3) (Vernon
1987 Supp.); see also id. art. 2.01. See generally Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause
in the Certificate of Incorporation: A Clause in Search of a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
476 (1984), reprinted 28 Corp. Prac. Commentator 297 (1986).
111. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act (1955) art. 3.02A(2).
112. Id. art. 2.03.
113. Id. arts. 4.08-4.10.
114. Id. arts. 2.12-2.13.
115. Id. art. 2.22.
116. Id. art. 2.33.
117. Id. art. 2.36.
118. Id. art. 9.10A.
119. Id. arts. 5.11-5.13.
120. Id. arts. 4.02, 4.03, 5.03, 5.10.
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abolished (with minor exceptions) the ultra vires doctrine which had
hampered corporations with single or narrow purposes. 121 The Act pro-
vided cumulative voting of shares (a proportional representation device)
unless denied in the charter.122 It made the directors' (or shareholders')
determination of the value of property received for shares conclusive in
the absence of fraud.123 It set detailed limits on the payment of dividends
and other distributions.' 24
The 1955 TBCA had a 5-year transition period in which it did not apply
to preexisting corporations unless they adopted it.125 Institutes were held
to publicize the Act and assist lawyers in dealing with it.12 6
Despite the TBCA's advances, Texas was regarded even by many Texas
lawyers as less attractive than Delaware as a place to incorporate, particu-
larly as to loans to and indemnification of officers and directors, share-
holder appraisal rights, and certain shareholder vote requirements.
The TBCA continued to serve well1 27 partly because it was well
drafted initially and partly because it has had the continuing attention of
the Corporations Committee of the State Bar. The Committee watched
for problems in the Act and served as a clearing house for problems dis-
covered by others. It proposed amendments to solve problems which
seemed worthy of legislative action. The Committee has written substan-
tially all of the amendments since 1955 as well as comments-published
in Vernon's Texas Annotated Texas Statutes-on the original Act and
amendments. The comments explain the provisions, advise on their use,
and reveal their drafters' intent. 128 They serve as an unofficial legislative
history that is valuable in a state where official legislative history was
rarely substantive or easily accessible.
A Non-Profit Corporation Act, 129 passed in 1959, was parallel in struc-
ture to the TBCA and was also the product of the Bar's Corporations
Committee. Prof. Margaret Amsler of Baylor headed this effort.1 30
121. Id. art. 2.04.
122. Id. art. 2.29D.
123. Id. art. 2.16C.
124. Id. arts. 2.38-2.40.
125. Id. § 9.14B.
126. E.g., Proceedings, Texas Business Corporation Act Institute (Nov. 10-11, 1955),
reprinted in 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 443 (Vernon 1956). Educational efforts dealing
with later amendments included Bromberg, Corporate Organizational Documents and Se-
curities-Forms and Comments, 28 Sw. L.J. 874 (1974), reprinted in State Bar of Texas,
PRACTICE SKILLS COURSE (1975) and in 18 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1 and 137 (1976);
Alan R. Bromberg, Corporate Organizational Documents and Securities-Forms and Com-
ments Revised, 30 Sw. L.J. 961 (1976).
127. A 10th anniversary evaluation is Carrington, The Texas Business Corporation Act
As Enacted and Ten Years Later, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 609 (1965).
128. Other educational efforts of the Committee are cited in nn. 101-02, 121 above and
accompanying text.
129. 1959 Tex. Laws 286, now, with amendments, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts.
1396-1.01 - 1396-11.01.
130. See Margaret H. Amsler, The Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. Past, Present and
Prospective, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 307 (1958). My followup helped users of the Act, Alan R.
Bromberg, Non-Profit Corporations: Organizational Problems and Tax Exemptions, 17
BAYLOR L. REV. 125 (1965).
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3.3 PARTNERSHIPS
Paul Carrington's work on the Business Corporations Act was an inspi-
ration to many of us. As an associate in the law firm he headed, I had a
minor hand in the original TBCA. Shortly after I joined the SMU law
faculty in 1956, I became a member of the State Bar Corporations Com-
mittee and have participated in its activities since then. My early teaching
and writing focused partly on general partnerships, then entirely a matter
of case law. This work led me to see problems there similar to those in
corporations, and to propose a similar solution based on the 1914 Uni-
form Partnership Act.131 Paul Carrington's support was instrumental in
John Jackson's appointment of a Dallas Bar Committee in 1959 to study
and refine that proposal. I chaired that Committee which studied the
Uniform Act over the course of a year and made some modifications,
particularly to adapt to Texas community property concepts. The Com-
mittee's bill was published for comment,132 sponsored by the State Bar,
and enacted with few amendments in 1961.133 The main changes accom-
plished by the Act included preponderant treatment of the partnership as
an entity (rather than as an aggregate of individuals), clearer rules for
determining the existence of a partnership when disputed, clarification of
the very limited rights of partners in specific partnership property, estab-
lishment of priority of partnership creditors in partnership assets, crea-
tion of a charging order for a partner's individual creditor against his or
her interest in the partnership, authorization of a partnership to acquire
and dispose of any estate in real property, specification of rights of part-
ners inter se, clarification of the grounds and consequences of dissolution
and authority for the partners to agree that death would not dissolve.134
The Act codified the fiduciary obligations of partners which were already
well developed in case law. 135 Bar Committee members provided gui-
dance for users.136
131. Byron D. Sher & Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century-
Why Texas Should Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263 (1958).
132. Bromberg, The Proposed Uniform Partnership Act, 14 Sw. L.J. 437 (1960).
133. 1961 Tex. Laws 289, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon
1962) later replaced by TRPA discussed in Part 4.3(2) below. The changes made in the
Legislature, and the reasons for them, are detailed in Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Uniform
Partnership Act-The Enacted Version, 15 Sw. L.J. 386 (1961).
134. See generally, Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences,
and Cures, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 631 (1965).
135. E.g., Johnson v, Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938). Much of Texas fiduciary law
developed in cases of sharp trading among partners or joint venturers in the oil and gas
industry. Examples besides Johnson v. Peckham include Huffington v. Upchurch, 532
S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976); Smith v. Bolin, 271 S.W.2d 93 (1954), on remand, 294 S.W.2d 280
(Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1956, writ refused n.r.e.); Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256
(1951); MacDonald v. Folett, 180 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1944). On fiduciary duty in corpora-
tions, see e.g., Int'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
136. Alan R. Bromberg & Joseph M. Stuhl, A Suggested Form of Partnership Agree-
ment for Use under Texas Uniform Partnership Act, 24 TEX. BAR J. 933 (1961), modified
and reprinted, inter alia, in ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP
597 (1968), in 19 ROBERT HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 85
(1973), and in F. ELLIOTT & HAL M. BATEMAN, 8A WEST'S TEXAS FORMS-BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES: PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 37 (1980); Alan R.
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The partnership statute served well, partly because it leaves the part-
ners almost complete freedom to determine by agreement the structure
of their firm and their relations to one another. A national move began to
revise the 1914 Uniform Partnership Act, in part along lines developed in
Texas. 137
Prof. Arthur L. Harding of SMU is credited with pointing out the need
for a more usable limited partnership law, especially in oil and gas drilling
activity. The 1916 Uniform Limited Partnership Act was passed in Texas
in 1955,138 replacing the 1846 statute discussed above. The later Act gave
limited partners better protection against liability. It rejected the concept
that limited partners were in essence general partners but shielded from
liability only by strict compliance with prescribed formalities of organiza-
tion and operation. Substantial compliance with formalities became suffi-
cient. Limited partners' contributions could be in property as well as cash.
Restrictions on distribution of profits and return of contributions were
eased. But the Act adhered to the basic concept that a limited partner
taking part in control of the partnership business loses limited liability.
A Partnership Committee of the State Bar was formed in 1974. I have
been a member since its inception, and chaired it in 1979-81. It became
the monitor and modifier of the partnership statutes as the Corporations
Committee was of the corporation statutes. One of its first projects was to
clarify the uncertain status of limited partnerships formed in other states
but doing business in Texas. A 1977 amendment drafted largely by
George W. Coleman of the Dallas Bar and me provided for voluntary
qualification as a foreign limited partnership; qualification would assure
that internal affairs and liabilities of limited partners would be governed
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the partnership was formed.139
The Texas Supreme Court in its famous 1975 Delaney opinion mani-
fested 19th century hostility to limited liability by calling for strict compli-
ance with the limited partnership act and holding that limited partners
would be personally liable for partnership debts if they took part in con-
trol of the partnership business in the capacity as officers and directors of
the corporate general partner. 140 The court effectively disregarded the
separate entity of the corporation. And, more seriously, the court raised,
but did not decide, the question whether a corporation could be the sole
general partner of a limited partnership. Virtually all corporate lawyers
Bromberg, Source and Comments, 17 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. 234 (Vernon 1962); Alan
R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43 TEXAS L.
REV. 631 (1965), modified and reprinted in 7 LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
27 and 159 (1966); ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP (1968).
137. UPA REVISION SUBCOMM. OF ABA PARTNERSHIP COMM., CoRP'., BANK. & Bus
LAW SECTION, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised? (Apr. 1986).
138. 1955 Tex. Laws 471 codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon
1970), later replaced by TRLPA discussed in Part. 4.3(1) below.
139. 1977 Tex. Laws 1107, now TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a § 32 (Vernon
Supp 1987). The same amendment authorized limited partners to sign by power of attor-
ney, now id. § 33.
140. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
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thought it plain that both partnership and corporate law expressly permit-
ted corporate general partners, and corporate general partners were
widely used. Seizing on the mention of the issue in Delaney and a 1945
public policy statement of the Supreme Court that had been flatly contra-
dicted by later legislation, the Attorney General opined in 1978 that a
corporation could not be the sole general partner of a limited partner-
ship. 141 An immediate outcry, including sharp criticism by law professors
at SMU, Texas Tech and Austin, 142 led to withdrawal of that part of the
opinion within a week. 143
The same Attorney General's Opinion concluded that unanimous con-
sent of partners was necessary for various actions including dissolution,
asset sale, and amendment of the partnership agreement. This too pro-
voked outcry, 144 and concession of error by the Attorney General. 145 To
put these and related problems to rest the State Bar Partnership Commit-
tee wrote and procured passage of amendments in 1979 authorizing cor-
porations (and partnerships, trusts, estates and others) to be general or
limited partners,146 and permitting nonunanimous votes as provided in
the partnership certificate. 147 The amendments also shielded limited part-
ners from personal liability in a variety of situations including acting as
officers or directors of corporate general partners and voting on dissolu-
tion, amendment, asset sale and other important matters.' 48 And even if
they took part in control, they would be liable only to a creditor reasona-
bly believing them to be general partners. Thus were the Delaney and
Attorney General's views rejected in favor of flexibility and limited part-
ner protection. 149
The Bar Partnership Committee provided comments on the 1977 and
1979 amendments,'150 as well as a heavily annotated model form of lim-
141. Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. H-1229 (Aug. 16, 1978).
142. The professors' letter of Aug. 22, 1978 to the Attorney General was published later
in Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz and Winship, Corporate General Partners, 16
BULL. OF SEC. ON CORP., BANK. & Bus. LAW 24 (No. 1, Sept. 1978).
143. Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. H-1229a (Aug. 23, 1978).
144. E.g., Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz and Winship, UNANIMITY RE-
QUIREMENTS IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, 16 BULL. OF SEC. ON CORP., BANK. & Bus. LAW 3
(No. 2, Dec. 1978).
145. Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. H-1321 (Dec. 29, 1978) (unanimity "is not necessarily
required").
146. 1979 Tex. Laws 1781 §§ 2 and 5, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132b
§ 6-A and art. 6132a § 2-A (Vernon Supp. 1980), later replaced. by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 6132b §§ 2.01(a), 1.01(14) and art. 6132a-1 § 1.02(6) and (12) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
147. 1979 Tex. Laws ch. 723 § 3, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132a
§ 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987), later art. 6132a-1 § 3.03(b)(8)(H) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
148. 1979 Tex. Laws 1781 § 2, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132b § 8
(Vernon Supp. 1980), later TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6132a-1 § 3.03(b) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
149. The policy issues are well discussed in George Coleman & David A. Weatherbie,
Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. L.J. 887 (1976).





The federal Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
have dominated securities law since their enactment. But they expressly
preserved state jurisdiction. So state law continued to be important, es-
pecially in states like Texas which required securities to meet a govern-
ment-tested "fairness" or "merit" standard rather than letting investors
make their own decisions on fully disclosed information about the
security.
The 1913 Texas Securities Act mentioned above was tightened some-
what by its 1923 replacement, which was notable for raising the criminal
penalties for certain securities violation to 10 years in prison. 152 A more
comprehensive law was passed in 1935,153 probably inspired by the specu-
lations and misfortunes of the 1920s and the federal laws of 1933 and 1934
they elicited. The 1935 Texas law broadened the state official's discretion
to grant (or deny) a permit to sell securities by adding the famous "fair,
just and equitable" test.154 The law required registration of securities
dealers and agents (salespeople).1 55 Many exemptions were added,
among them bona fide reorganizations, mergers, trust companies, and
151. Partnership Law Committee, Limited Partnership: Model Agreement and Certifi-
cate With Commentaries, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 25 (1985).
152. 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws 114. The 10 year penalties are in §§ 12, 14, and 17. Other
changes included broadening the coverage to embrace interests in joint stock associations
and other noncorporate organizations. The standard for granting a permit was amplified to
include a requirement "that values warrant" the permit. Id. § 5. But there was relaxation
in an important respect: the limit on expenses and promotion was raised from 15% to 20%
and "stock issued for property or other things of its equivalent value shall not be classsed
as promotion stock, the values at which such property is accepted to be approved by the
Secretary of State." Id. Escrow of sale proceeds, secured by a bond of the promoters, was
authorized in some situations. Id. § 6. Offers were more explicitly regulated. Id. § 9. Co-
operation with federal authorities was authorized. Id. § 10. Mergers had to be approved by
the Secretary of State and a majority of the stockholders. Id. §§ 11-12. Dividends "out of
any funds other than the actual earnings" were outlawed. Id. §§ 13-14. Ten year prison
sentences were prescribed for most violations, Id. §§ 12, 14, 17, 19. Newspapers were pro-
hibited from carrying advertisements for securities that lacked permits; sanctions were$100-$1,000 and 10 days - 6 months jail. Id. § 18. The Secretary of State was to publish at
least quarterly a summary of permit applications and his finding as to each concern
"whether such concern was solvent and whether ... it was or is fraudulent... to secure for
the benefit of the people the utmost publicity respecting the affairs of concerns whose
stock is obtainable by them." Id. § 21. New exemptions included building and loan corpo-
rations and "solvent going concern[s] for a period of two years." Id. §§ 20, 6a. The munifi-
cent sum of $7,500 was appropriated to carry out the purposes of the Act for the first year.
Id. § 25. The emergency clause sounded a familiar theme of victimization of local citizens
and a new theme of victimization of out of state citizens by Texas promoters: "Texas has in
recent years been flooded with worthless securities, issued and sold by irresponsible parties
to the people of this State, resulting in great loss to investors, especially wage earners, a
class least able to stand such losses, and . . . many companies have organized and made
their domicile, or home office in this State, and sold worthless securities through the mails
and otherwise, to people in other states by reason of inadequate laws in this State." Id.
§ 29.
153. 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 255.
154. Id. § 8.
155. Id. §§ 12-15.
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companies listed on the major stock exchanges. 156 Until 1941157 the Se-
curities Act contained no provision for private actions for violation, al-
though common law and other statutory private causes of action were
available.
Enforcement of the 1935 Act may have been lax. The trust company
exemption became a major loophole after it was construed to include any
company organized with trust powers. 158 Since corporations with trust
powers could then be readily organized with minimum capital and with-
out the supervision accorded bank-type trust companies, hundreds organ-
ized and sold widely their securities without permits. The scandals that
followed when many of them proved worthless prompted the 1955 Texas
Securities Act. 159 The Act was drafted with input from a newly appointed
State Bar Committee on Securities and Investment Banking, initially
chaired by Talbot Rain of Dallas and including William H. Tinsley of Dal-
las. The Act deleted the trust company exemption. 160 A 1957 Act' 6a was
similar but removed securities from the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
State and created a separate State Securities Board and Securities Com-
missioner to administer the Act.1 62 The first Commissioner was William
M. King, who previously served in the FBI and the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. He was brought in as, and served as, a vigorous enforcer
and strict construer for more than a decade. Much of the enforcement
was through the criminal laws, a tradition that continues today. Texas is
thought to have more criminal convictions for securities violations than
the rest of the states combined. In the 1957 Act criminal penalties were
down to $1,000 and two years prison.163
The 1957 Act also covered securities of insurance companies, which
had been exempt under the 1935 Act 164 and were another source of scan-
dal. Principal innovations of the 1957 Act165 (compared to 1935) included
registration by coordination for securities also registered with the federal
SEC,166 registration by notification for securities of well established com-
panies with specified levels of earnings, 67 requirement of the use of a full
156. Id. §§ 3(f), (g), (o), 23(f).
157. 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 593.
158. Carney v. Sam Houston Underwriters, Inc, 272 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin, error ref. n.r.e.).
159. 1955 Tex. Laws 322.
160. The background and content of the 1955 Act, with particular reference to the trust
company exemption, are explained in Tinsley, The Texas Securities Act, 18 TEX. B. J. 275
(1955).
161. 1957 Tex. Laws 575 now, with amendments, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 581-1 - 581-
39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1987).
162. Id. §§ 2-3.
163. 1957 Tex. Laws 598 § 29.
164. 1935 Tex. Laws 255, 172-72, § 23(g).
165. See generally Julian M. Meer, The Texas Securities Act-1957 Model: Facelift or
Forward Look?, 36 TEXAs L. REV. 429 (1958).
166. 1957 Tex. Laws § 7C. This was taken from Uniform Securities Act § 303 (1956)
with the addition of Texas' "fair, just and equitable standard."
167. Id. § 7B.
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disclosure prospectus in most offerings, 168 permission to use preliminary
prospectuses encouraged by federal law, 169 extension of the "fair, just and
equitable" requirement to the price paid by promoters or founders when
less than the price charged the public, 70 exemption of unsolicited
purchase orders,' 71 exemption of sales where total securities holders (or
partners) would not exceed 35,172 and exemption of secondary trading in
securities already outstanding.173
The 1957 Act proved troublesome in many respects. Some of the
problems were caused by misinterpretation by the courts, and required
legislative or administrative correction. A ruling that "person" did not
include "corporation,"' 174 so that the corporations were free of the Act,
was soon reversed but called for an amendment to be sure. 175 A ruling
that a "brochure" used to sell stock was "advertising" that would destroy
the private offering exemption 176 was effectively reversed by administra-
tive interpretation. 177 A ruling that commissions could not be collected
by an unregistered person on an exempt transaction 78 required a statu-
tory reaffirmation of the plain meaning to the contrary. 179
Other amendments stemmed from perceived needs: for a small offering
exemption for interests in oil and gas properties, 180 for an expanded small
offering exemption after a company acquired 35 shareholders,' 81 for rule
making authority in the State Securities Board, 82 for authority to put
168. Id. § 9C.
169. Id. § 22.
170. Id. § 10A.
171. Id. § 5P.
172. Id. § 5.1. A similar exemption for oil and gas interests was added as § 5Q of the
Act by 1959 Tex. Laws 147.
173. Id. § 5.0.
174. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1971), rev'd 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971). The earlier decision was criticized in J. Leon
Lebowitz, Corporations, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 112-21 (1972).
175. 1971 Tex. Laws 1085 § 1, now § 4B of the Act. The emergency clause disavowed
the earlier Dempsey opinion and confirmed that the Legislature's intent was always to
include "corporation" in "person" for civil liability. Id. § 2. However, corporations remain
excluded from the criminal provisions of § 29 of the Act by the last sentence of § 4B.
176. Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont, error ref. n.r.e.), criticized in Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offer-
ings of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 239 (1966).
177. The interpretation is now 7 TEx. ADM]N. CODE § 109.13(b), 3A CCH Blue Sky L.
Rep. T 55,563(b).
178. Rowland Corp. v. Integrated Sys. Technology, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1971, writ ref. n.r.e.), criticized in Alan R. Bromberg, Collectibility of Com-
missions on Exempt Transactions in Securities, 11 Bull. of Sec. on Corp., Bank. & Bus. Law
(State Bar of Tex.) 3 (No. 1, Oct 1973) and in J. Leon Lebowitz, Recent Developments in
Texas Corporation Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 823, 864-67 (1974).
179. 1975 Tex. Laws 199 § 3, amending § 34 of the Act.
180. 1959 Tex. Laws 147, now TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5Q (Vernon Supp.
1987).
181. 1963 Tex. Laws 473 § 4, adding § 5.1(c) to the Act, permitting sales for up to 15
buyers every 12 months. See Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of
Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537 (1964).
182. 1975 Tex. Laws 204 § 2, now, with amendments, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
581-28-1 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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fraudulent dealers into receivership, 183 for clearer civil liabilities and stat-
utes of limitations, 184 for stiffer criminal penalties, 185 and for clearer rules
on when and how offers might be made. 186
The Texas Securities Act remained seriously flawed. It contains some
miserable drafting-including twisted and imprecise definitions, inconsis-
tent language in related sections, redundancies and 500-word sentences.
It had inadequate exemptions for investor resale of securities. 187 It liter-
ally makes a dealer-subject to registration requirements'S-of every-
one who buys or sells a security, including ordinary investors.18 9 Its
statutes of limitations for private suits for fraud (generally three years
from discovery with a five year cutoff)190 or for failure to register (three
years) 191 are among the longest in the nation, giving investors unjustifi-
able opportunities to speculate on the success of a company (or the mar-
ket for its securities) and then sue for refund if they are disappointed.
The most serious drawback of the Securities Act is the requirement
that the Commissioner find that plan of business of the issuer and the
price of a security are "fair, just and equitable" before the security can be
registered for public sale.' 92 This "merit" standard is vague, paternalistic,
interferes with market access by honest businesses needing capital, limits
choice by investors and requires superhuman wisdom and judgment to
exercise properly the broad discretion it grants the Commissioner. The
standard has been interpreted, among other things, to set a number of
arbitrary limits (e.g., on compensation, minimum investment by promot-
183. 1975 Tex. Laws 206 § 4, now TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-25-1 (Vernon
Supp. 2001).
184. 1963 Tex. Laws 478 § 12, amending § 33 of the Act; 1977 Tex. Laws 344 § 1,
amending § 33 of the Act. Before the 1963 amendment, § 33 provided merely that sales in
violation of the Act were "voidable" without distinguishing among possible violations. The
1963 and 1977 amendments specified the violations giving rise to liability (including fraud
in purchase as well as in sale), prescribed the measure of liability, and extended liability to
controlling persons and aiders of violators. They authorized the shortening of statute of
limitations by making a rescission offer. Fuller discussions will be found in Hal M. Bate-
man, Securities Litigation: The 1977 Modernization of Section 33 of the Texas Securities Act,
15 HOUSTON L. REV. 839 (1978); ALAN R. BROMBERG, CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER TEXAS
SECURITIES AcT § 33 (1977) and Related Claims, 32 Sw. L.J. 867 (1978); Claude P. Bord-
wine, Civil Remedies Under the Texas Securities Act, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 657 (1971); Julian
M. Meer, A New Look at the Texas Securities Act, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 680 (1965).
185. The sanctions of 2 years and $1,000 in the 1957 Act, n.158 above, were increased
to: 10 years and $5,000 for most violations in 1961 Tex. Laws. 1047, and to 10 years (not
less than 2 years) and $5,000 for fraud violations involving less than $10,000 and 20 years
(not less than 2 years) and $10,000 for fraud violations involving $10,000 or more in 1983
Tex. Laws 2711, now TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29C (Vernon Supp. 2001).
186. 1979 Tex. Laws 357 § 5, now TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-22 (Vernon Supp.
2001).
187. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-5C(1) and 581-5.0 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
188. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
189. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4C (Vernon Supp.2001).
190. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
191. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H, I (Vernon Supp. 2001).
192. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-10A (Vernon Supp. 2001). Similar language
appears in id. art. 581-7C(2) with a slightly different burden of proof; the Commissioner
may deny registration if she finds that the registrant has not proved "fair, just and equita-
ble." There seems to be no practical difference in application.
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ers, maximum numbers of options), to inhibit certain kinds of actions
(such as loans to officers), to influence (i.e. reduce) the price at which a
security can be sold, and to require escrow and possible cancellation of
previously issued securities.' 93 These are inappropriate kinds of actions
for a government agency to take. They have a particularly chilling impact
on new, small or speculative enterprises. This was especially unfortunate
as Texas turned to high technology-often developed in new compa-
nies-to stimulate an economy that lagged badly with the drop in oil and
gas prices.
The merit standards are hotly debated.' 94 But it was widely agreed that
their application had made Texas the most difficult state in the U.S. in
which to register securities for public sale.' 95
The State Bar Securities Committee tried unsuccessfully in 1969, 1983
and 1985 to modernize and clarify the Securities Act and delete or limit
the merit standard. 196 Leaders of the Bar forces included Charles H. Still,
John E. Dees, Jr. and me. Leaders of the opposition were former Securi-
ties Commissioners William M. King and Roy Mouer. The 1985 proposal
passed the House, where Rep. Steve Wolens sponsored it, by a margin of
almost four to one. A head count indicated a majority for it in the Senate,
where Sen. Ray Farrabee sponsored it, after it had been favorably re-
ported by Committee. But the Bill was caught in a cross fire between the
American Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers over exemption for securities listed in the NASD's Automated
Quotations system. As a result, it never mustered the two thirds vote nec-
essary to bring it onto the Senate floor. However, these efforts led to two
amendments which softened somewhat the harshness of the merit stan-
dard. One states the general purpose of the Securities Act to be "to pro-
193. See, e.g., State Secs. Bd., 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 113.3, 3A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.
55,583. The specific requirements were later amended except for particular kinds of of-
ferings, mainly limited partnerships. See State Secs. Bd., 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 113.2, 3A
CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. I 55,590B and references there.
194. See, e.g., Ernest W. Walker & Beverly B. Hadaway, An Investigation of the Effi-
cacy of the Merit Standards of the Securities Act of the State of Texas (June 5, 1981), sub-
stantially reprinted as Ernest W. Walker & Beverly B. Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited:
An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651
(1982)(defending); Hal M. Bateman, Statement Concerning "Full Disclosure" Securities Re-
gistration in Texas, 20 BULL. OF SEC. ON CORI'. BANK. & Bus. LAw (State Bar of Texas) 4(No. 1, Oct. 1982) (attacking). On similar issue not limited to Texas, see Conrad G. Good-
kind, Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79 (defending); Ruther-
ford B. Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L.
553 (1985) (attacking); Mark A. Sargent, Blue Sky Law-The Challenge to Merit Regula-
tion-Part 1, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276 (1984),-Part 11, id. 367 (1985) (balanced); American
Bar Assoc., Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation, Report on State Merit Regulation of
Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986) (balanced).
195. This is the view of virtually every securities lawyer I have ever talked to. It is also
the finding of a statistical survey of securities lawyers. Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practition-
ers and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and a Ranking of States by Stringency of
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689 (1985).
196. The 1969 and 1983 proposals are described in some detail in Alan R. Bromberg,
The Proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act, 31 TEX. BAR J. 1030 (1968) and Alan R.
Bromberg, Texas Securities Act, 46 TEX. BAR J. 36 (1983).
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tect investors and consistent with that purpose, to encourage capital
formation, job formation, and free and competitive securities markets
and to minimize regulatory burdens on issuers and persons subject to this
Act, especially small businesses. ' 197 The other allows the Commissioner
allows to "waive or relax any restriction or requirement in the [State Se-
curities] Board's rules that, in his opinion, is unnecessary for the protec-
tion of investors in a particular case." 198
The Board used its rule making power to liberalize small offering ex-
emptions substantially and to coordinate them partially with federal
exemptions.1 99
3.5 COMMERCIAL LAW
In 1967 Texas thoroughly modernized its commercial law by adopt-
ing200 the 1962 version of the Uniform Commercial Code. This replaced
the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Stock Transfer, Trust Re-
ceipts and Warehouse Receipts Acts, and various chattel mortgage and
conditional sales laws. Along with the Texas Business Corporation Act,
the UCC is in the top rank of changes in Texas corporate and commercial
law during this period. Much of the impetus for the UCC came from
banks and other lenders.
4. THE ECONOMY HAS PROBLEMS BUT RECOVERS AND
FURTHER ENCOURAGES BUSINESS AND LOOSENS
CONSTRAINTS (1980s-2001)
There were bad years. Oil prices declined. Banks and savings and loan
associations made too many bad loans and were taken over by the gov-
ernment or were merged with out-of-state institutions. The real estate
values inflated by bad loans collapsed. But population increases and high
technology provided uplift.
These two decades included hundreds of changes in the business entity
laws. Much of the legislation discussed here and in the previous section
originated from the corporation, partnership and securities committees
of the State Bar Business Law Section and their offshoot committees on
limited liability companies and on non-profit corporations. Members of
those committees typically appeared at hearings on the Bills. After the
State Bar decided that Sections and their committees should not appear
before the Legislature as Bar representatives, the Texas Business Law
197. 1983 Tex. Laws 2716 § 3, now TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 581-10-1 (Vernon Supp.
2001).
198. 1983 Tex. Laws 2716 § 4, now TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 581-10D (Vernon Supp.
2001).
199. State Secs. Bd., 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.13, 3A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 55,563.
The main-and very important-Texas deviation from federal law is the requirement that
a nonaccredited investor be sophisticated or that the investment be suitable for the inves-
tor. Id. § 109.13(k)(8)
200. 1967 Tex. Laws ch. 785, p. 2343, now (with amendments), TEX. Bus. & COMM.
CODE §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1968 and Supp. 2001).
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Foundation was created in 1988 to support business legislation, particu-
larly that stemming from the Bar committees. 20 1 Business legislation of
the 1980s and 1990s was written in the context of increasing takeovers of
one company by another and extensive litigation against directors.
4.1 CORPORATIONS
The American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws pre-
pared a revised Model Business Corporation Act (1985) with Prof. Rob-
ert W. Hamilton of the University of Texas as Reporter. The Model Act
and its later changes were studied by and had influences on the Texas
drafters. The same was true of the frequently amended Delaware General
Corporation Law.
The TBCA continued to serve well. Its flexibility increased by a num-
ber of amendments including authorization of rights, options and con-
vertibles,202 voting agreements, 20 3 other committees of directors, 20 4 one-
person boards of directors,20 5 actions by directors by unanimous consent
without a meeting, 20 6 telephone meetings of shareholders, directors and
committees,20 7 one incorporator (rather than three), 208 charter amend-
ment without shareholder or director action in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion,209 and extremely flexible provisions for close corporations. 210 The
shareholder vote for merger, consolidation, asset sale and dissolution has
been reduced from 4/5ths to 2/3d and may be reduced by charter provi-
sion to a simple majority.2 1' The 19th century restrictions on corporate
ownership of land were finally repealed in 1981.212
The 1981 Close Corporation Law added flexibility for closely-held and
informally run companies by allowing their shareholder agreements to
override the usual rigidities of corporate director-officer-shareholder di-
vision of roles.213
1983 saw the first of several amendments to expand, set standards for
and clarify corporate power to indemnify, advance expenses to and buy
201. See Alan R. Bromberg, Byron F. Egan, Dan L. Nicewander & Robert S. Trotti,
The Role of the Business Law Section and the Texas Business Law Foundation in the Devel-
opment of Texas Business Law, 31 BULL. Bus. LAW. SEC. (State Bar of Texas) 2 (No, 2,
June 1994).
202. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.14-1.
203. Id. art. 2.30B.
204. Id. art. 2.36.
205. Id. art. 2.32.
206. Id. art. 9.10B.
207. Id. art. 9.10B, C.
208. Id. art. 3.01.
209. Id. art. 4.14.
210. Id. arts. 12.01-12.54.
211. Id. arts. 5.03, 5.10, 6.03, 9.08.
212. 1981 Tex. Laws 848 § 34, repealing what was then TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
1302-4.01 - 1302-4.07 (Vernon 1980) generally prohibiting a corporation to buy land "un-
less.., necessary to enable such corporation to do business in this State", permitting "town
lot corporations" (those buying, subdividing and selling land in incorporated cities or
within two miles of their boundaries), and authorizing escheat of lands held in violation.
213. 1981 Tex. Laws. ch. 818 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 12.01-12.54.
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insurance for directors and officers sued because of their corporate
role.
2 1 4
Business corporations and other types of organizations under a variety
of statutes were allowed in 1987 by the Miscellaneous Corporation Laws
Act to shield their directors from personal liability to their corporations,
shareholders or members by amending their articles of incorporation.
The immunity was for their acts or omissions in their director capacities.
But it did not apply if they were found liable for breach of their loyalty
duty, intentional misconduct of knowing violation of law, receipt of im-
proper personal benefit, or an act for which a statute expressly provided
liability.2 15
The year 1987 was also the time for dropping cumbersome earned sur-
plus, capital surplus and reduction surplus tests for allowable dividends to
shareholders and repurchases of shares. The new test permitted distribu-
tions-defined to include dividends and repurchases 216 - from surplus
unless the distribution would leave the corporation insolvent. 217 Surplus
remained defined as net assets minus stated capital.2 18 But net assets
could be determined on a variety of bases including consolidated finan-
cial statements, tax-basis financial statements, fair valuation or informa-
tion from any other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.
219
Dennis Anderson chaired the Bar Committee at this period and was
principally responsible for this change.
A contemporaneous amendment resolved indirectly the uncertainty
whether a sale consisted of substantially all the assets and therefore re-
quired a shareholder vote. Since sales made in the regular course of busi-
ness did not require shareholder vote, the amendment declared a sale to
be in the regular course of business if the corporation directly or indi-
rectly continued to engage in one or more businesses or applied a portion
of the sale consideration to the conduct of a business.220
The first of several efforts to protect shareholders against piercing the
corporate veil occurred in 1989. The impetus was the Castleberry case.
221
There the court used very broad language to allow shareholder liability
for corporate contracts if the corporation was used as a sham to perpe-
trate a fraud, stating that constructive fraud would suffice if injustice
would otherwise occur. An amendment in a separate Bill responded spe-
cifically to that language by denying shareholder liability for contracts of
the corporation on the basis of actual or constructive fraud or sham to
perpetrate a fraud unless the plaintiff demonstrated that the shareholder
214. 1983 Tex. Laws 3143-50 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art 2.02-1
215. 1987 Tex. Laws ch. 424 § 1 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1306-7.06
(Vernon Supp. 2001). The article was later amended to include other entities.
216. 1987 Tex. Laws 205 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 1.02(18).
217. 1987 Tex. Laws. 212-13 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r art. 2.38.
218. 212. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 1.02(12).
219. 1987 Tex. Laws 214 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.38-3.
220. 1987 Tex. Laws 221 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.09B. My recollection is that
Michael M. Boone devised this approach.
221. Castleberry v. Brancsum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
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caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and
did actually perpetrate an actual fraud on the plaintiff primarily for the
direct personal benefit of the shareholder. 222 That Bill countered another
veil-piercing theory by denying shareholder liability for a corporate con-
tractual obligation because of failure to observe corporate formalities. 22 3
The 1993 amendment rejected alter ego as a basis for piercing the corpo-
rate veil and purported to bar all other piercing theories by stating that
liability under this TBCA section "is exclusive and preempts any other
shareholder liability" for a corporate obligation.22 4
A radical form of merger arrived on the scene in 1989. In it a corpora-
tion could be divided and two or more corporations could merge and two
or more could survive.225 Even Delaware had no such statute. Domestic
corporations could merge with existing or newly created domestic or for-
eign corporations. If two or more corporations survived, assets and liabili-
ties could be allocated among them according to the merger plan.22 6 So
could responsibility for paying dissenting shareholders. 227 This made it
possible to allocate assets to one entity and liabilities to another with ben-
efit to the former and harm to the latter.
Also novel was the share exchange by which one corporation could
acquire the shares of one or more other entities as subsidiaries with ap-
proval of the directors and shareholders of each entity.228 A merger or
share exchange required a two thirds approval of the shareholders enti-
tled to vote in each corporation. 229 If the plan made specified changes in
a class of securities, such as altering its preferences or relative rights, the
transaction required also a two-thirds approval of that class.230 Share-
holder vote of a corporation was not required in a merger if the corpora-
tion was the sole survivor, its articles of incorporation and rights of prior
shareholders remained the same and its shares were not increased by
more than 20% in the merger.231 This was a simplified way of acquiring a
subsidiary.
The right to dissent from a merger or share exchange-and to receive
fair value for shares - was denied to publicly held shares (those with at
least 2,000 holders) or publicly traded shares (those on a national securi-
ties exchange) who received publicly held or publicly traded shares in the
222. 1989 Tex. Laws 974 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.21A(2).
223. 1989 Tex. Laws. 974-75 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.21A(3). Another
Bill at the same session rejected failure to follow formalities as a basis for piercing. 1989
Tex. Laws 3617 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.21A(2).
224. 1993 Tex. Laws 446 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.21A and B.
225. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3629-30 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.01. J. Patrick Gar-
rett was the proponent and probable author.
226. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3629-30, 3625-36 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr arts.
5.01B(2)(a), (c), 5.06A(2), (3).
227. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3629-30 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.01B(2)(b).
228. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3632-32 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Am- art. 5.02. The rarely used
section for consolidations was replaced by this article.
229. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3632-33 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACm art. 5.03E.
230. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3633 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.03F.
231. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3633 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.03G.
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transaction.232 The right of shareholders to act without a meeting by
unanimous consent was expanded-if the articles so stated-to include
acting by the consent (either majority or two thirds) that would be re-
quired at a meeting. 233 As a protection against surprise takeovers by this
method, the necessary signatures had to be obtained, and the consent
filed with the corporation, within 60 days of the first signature. 234
Other 1989 amendments eased the grant of stock options by allowing
them to be issued by the board of directors without consideration if the
board found that it was in the interest of the company.235 A statute of
limitations was added to suits for violation of preemptive rights: the
shorter of one year from notice to the shareholders whose right was viola-
tion or four years from the issuance of the violating shares.236 Corpora-
tions received flexibility to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder
meetings to as little as one third,237 to set action as a majority of those
entitled to vote, those entitled and present, or those entitled and vot-
ing,23s and to change statutory shareholder voting requirements from ma-
jority of all shareholders to majority of those entitled to vote.239 Voting
agreements could include the corporation as a party (and thereby give it
standing to enforce) and shares could be voted as specified in the agree-
ment rather than only as a block. 240 More realistically, the corporation
was described as managed under the direction of the board of directors
rather than as managed by the board. 241 A class of shares could elect its
own directors and only holders of that class could remove those
directors. 242
In an effort to harmonize the law of different forms of organization, the
Business Corporation Act was designated as the supplemental law for
other kinds of organization whose statutes had no provisions on matters
covered by TBCA.24 3 This was intended to cover a variety of entities like
professional associations, professional corporations and limited liability
companies. Many of these already specified the TBCA as their supple-
mental law. However non-profit corporations were kept distinct.
1991 witnessed a number of revisions adding flexibility to financing and
capital structure. Corporations were able by provision in their charters
(articles of incorporation) to issue not only classes of shares but to divide
classes into series 244 and to make shares exchangeable at the corporation
232. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3637-38 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.11B.
233. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3643 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr art. 9.10A(1).
234. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3643 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 9.10A(2).
235. 1989 Tex. Laws 3616 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.14-1A.
236. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3618-19 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2-22-1,
237. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3621 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.28A.
238. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3621-22 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT arts. 2.28B for non-elec-
tions, 2.28C for elections.
239. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3622 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.28D.
240. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3623-24 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.30B.
241. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3624 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.31.
242. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3624-25 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.32.
243. 1989 Tex. Laws. 3644-45 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 9.14.
244. 1991 Tex. Laws 3161 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.12A.
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or holder's option not only into the corporation's other shares or prop-
erty but also for another entity's securities or property.245 And they
could do the same by action of their directors if the charter so permit-
ted.2 46 Directors elected by a particular class or series could be given
more or less than one vote on specified matters if the charter so stated.247
Subject to an ancient constitutional limitation-whose repeal was pro-
posed-corporations were permitted in 1991 to issue shares for promis-
sory notes and contracts for services to be performed. That limitation, in
the 1876 ban on issuing stock except for money paid, labor done or prop-
erty actually received 248 inhibited late 20th century forms of financing. It
was repealed in 1993.249 In concluding whether distributions could be
made to shareholders, directors might base their determination on for-
ward looking information relating to future economic performance, con-
dition or liquidity that was reasonable in the circumstances. 250 Directors
were protected from liability for improper distributions if they relied with
good faith and ordinary care on opinions or reports of officers, employ-
ees, board committees, or on lawyers, public accountants, investment
bankers or other persons as to matters reasonably believed to be within
their professional or expert competence.25 1 Officers were similarly pro-
tected in discharging their duties or powers.252
The notion that the corporate charter is a contract enforceable by
shareholders was at least partially negated by specifying that a share-
holder has no vested property right resulting from any provision in the
charter.253
The right of all shareholders to vote on a merger was curtailed. Voting
was restricted to only those shares entitled to vote by the terms of their
shares set by the charter or the board.254
A dissolved corporation acquired the opportunity to shorten the stan-
dard 3-year post-dissolution in which claims against it must be brought.
The corporation could notify someone having or asserting an existing
claim to present the claim in writing by a date at least 120 days after the
notice. Failure to present the claim by that date would extinguish it. Pres-
entation of the claim and rejection by the corporation would extinguish
the claim unless suit was filed within 120 days after the rejection. 255
1993 amendments to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act paralleled
245. 1991 Tex. Laws 3161-62 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.12B.
246. 1991 Tex. Laws 3162 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AC art. 2.13.
247. 1991 Tex. Laws 3167 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.32A.
248. See supra text accompanying note 49.
249. Tex. Const. art. 12, § 6 repealed by vote at Nov.2,1993 pursuant to 1993 Tex. Laws
5576, H.J.R. No. 57
250. 1991 Tex. Laws 3169 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.38-3A(4).
251. 240. 1991 Tex. Laws 3169-70 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.41D.
252. 1991 Tex. Laws 3170 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.42C.
253. 1991 Tex. Laws 3170-73 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 4.01B.
254. 1991 Tex. Laws 3181-82 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.10A(4).
255. 244. 1991 Tex. Laws 3189 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 7.12D.
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many of those made to the TBCA since 1959.256 But care was taken,
partly at the insistence of the Attorney General's office, not to impair
the charitable character of those organizations that had it, or the exemp-
tion from federal income tax of those who had that.
In 1995 BOB III (Business Organizations Bill III) was the third in the
sequence of Bills to amend the TBCA and other business organization
statutes supported by the Texas Business Law Foundation. It passed the
House but died in the Senate where it reached the intent calendar only on
the last day of the session. However, the useful Texas Unincorporated
Nonprofit Association Act (TUUNA) entered the black statutes. Follow-
ing a national uniform model, it established basic principles for a non-
profit association to, be recognized as a legal entity distinct from its
members, including ability to hold land, ability to sue and defend, nonlia-
bility of members as such for torts or contracts of the association, ability
of members to sue the organization and vice versa, and access of mem-
bers to the association's books and records.257
BOB III, rechristened BOB IV, achieved passage in 1997, making sig-
nificant changes in corporation, partnership and LLC statutes. The
changes were mostly toward increased flexibility of structure and man-
agement. But shareholder rights and protections were significantly re-
duced in the process.258
Shareholder derivative suits in 1997 met obstacles almost impossible to
overcome. The prospective plaintiff must make demand on the corpora-
tion stating his claim with particularity and requesting the corporation to
take suitable action. 259 He must then wait 90 days before suing unless he
can show irreparable injury to the corporation or his demand is re-
jected. 260 Discovery is stayed while the corporation actively reviews the
allegations in good faith, with provisions for 60-day renewals. 261 The
court must dismiss the suit if the board or committee determines in good
faith, after a reasonable inquiry and based on factors it deems appropri-
ate, that continuation of the suit is not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. 262 There is no provision for the court to review the plaintiff's
substantive claims or the reviewers' reasons. In determining whether the
stated requirements have been met, the burden is on the plaintiff share-
holder if a majority of the board is disinterested and independent. 263
Otherwise the burden is on the corporation but if the corporation
presents prima facie evidence that the directors on an appointed commit-
256. 1993 Tex. Laws ch, 733, pp. 2873-94.
257. 1995 Tex. Laws 4567-70 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.1396-70.01.
258. The fullest description of the changes and their rationale is Curtis W. Huff, The
New Business Organizations Laws: Changes Made in the7th Legislature to Address Modern
Business Practices, 34 TEX. J. Bus. LAW 1 (Summer 1997).
259. 1997 Tex. Laws 1541 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14C.
260. 1997 Tex. Laws 1541 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14C.
261. 1997 Tex. Laws 1541 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14D.
262. 1997 Tex. Laws 1541-42 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14F.
263. 1997 Tex. Laws 1541 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14F(1).
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tee are independent and disinterested, the burden is on the plaintiff.264 If
suit is filed after demand rejection, plaintiff must allege with particularity
facts showing, among other things, that the rejection was not made in
good faith, after reasonable inquiry.265 A dismissal determination must
be made by one of (1) a majority vote of independent and disinterested
directors present at a board meeting with interested directors absent if
the independent and disinterested directors constitute a quorum, 266 (2) a
majority vote of a committee of two or more independent and disinter-
ested directors appointed by a majority vote of one or more independent
and disinterested directors present at a board meeting, whether or not
they are a quorum2 67 or (3) a panel of one or more independent and
disinterested persons appointed by the court on motion of the corpora-
tion and found by the court to be disinterested, independent and quali-
fied to make determinations about the suit.268
Crucial to the derivative suit provisions are the meaning of disinter-
ested and independent. Disinterested is defined largely by negatives to
which there are further negatives. For example, a director is not disinter-
ested if she is materially involved in the challenged conduct and does not
have otherwise have a material interest in the outcome of the challenged
conduct but she is not considered materially involved in conduct solely
because she is named as a defendant in a derivative suit as a person who
engaged in the challenged conduct.269 A person is independent if she is
disinterested and she is not an associate or member of the immediate
family of a party to the transaction in question or of a person engaged in
the conduct in question.270 Additionally she, her associates and her im-
mediate family must not have a relationship with a party to the transac-
tion or a person who engaged in the conduct which could reasonably be
expected materially or adversely to affect her judgment with respect to
the disposition of the derivative claim.27' She must not be shown to be
under controlling influence of a party to the transaction or the person
engaged in the conduct.2 72 But neither of those two negatives apply
solely because she is nominated or elected as a director by persons inter-
ested in the transaction or who engaged in the conduct or because of
certain other factors or relationships.2 73
There are further obstacles to derivative suits. Settlement or discontin-
uance requires court approval; the court may require notice to affected
shareholders if it determines the settlement or discontinuance would sub-
264. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542-42 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AC" art. 5.14F(2).
265. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14G.
266. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14H(l).
267. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14H(2).
268. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14H(3).
269. 1997 Tex. Laws 1517 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 1.02(12)(f)(i).
270. 1997 Tex. Laws 1518 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 1.02(15)(a), (b)..
271. 1997 Tex. Laws 1518 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 1.02(15)(c).
272. 1997 Tex. Laws 1518 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 1.02(15)(d).
273. Id.
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stantially affect their interests. 274 The court may order the corporation to
pay plaintiff's expenses and legal fees if it finds substantial benefit to the
corporation from the suit.275 Or it may order plaintiff to pay the corpora-
tion's expenses and legal fees if it finds that suit was without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose.276 And it may order a party to pay the
expenses and legal fees of any party (including the corporation) if it finds
that a pleading or motion was not well grounded in fact after reasonable
inquiry, was not warranted by existing law or good faith argument for
extension or reversal, or was interposed for an improper purpose.277 A
derivative suit in the right of a foreign corporation, though governed by
its home state law as to internal affairs, would be subject to the procedu-
ral requirements of discovery stay, court approval of settlement or dis-
continuance and orders to pay fees and legal expenses. 278 Closely held
corporations escaped most of these obstacles but still faced court ap-
proval of settlement or discontinuance and orders to pay fees and legal
expenses.279 These were corporations with fewer than 35 shareholders
and no stock exchange listing or regular over the counter quotations.
280
The derivative litigation section resembles the one in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act and was primarily the work of Curtis W. Huff who
chaired the State Bar Corporation Law Committee during its drafting.
When we presented the Bill to the Legislature, I left it to Curtis to talk
about derivative suits. Since the derivative suit is the only practical way
of enforcing fiduciary duty, the restrictions on the suit effectively reduce
the scope of fiduciary duty in corporations.
In a sharp departure from the concept that all shares of a class have the
same rights, different holders of the same class of shares could be treated
differently in a merger or share exchange.28 But they were granted ap-
praisal rights if that occurred.282 A corporation could be converted into a
holding company by a merger with or into a wholly owned subsidiary
without a shareholder vote if share rights, charter, bylaws and directors
remained the same except for a required addition to the charter of the
surviving corporation specifying shareholder votes in all situations where
they would have been required in the original corporation.283 Dissent-
appraisal rights in mergers were denied to holders of shares listed on the
NASDAQ Stock Market or designated as national market securities on
an NASD quotation system if shareholders of the same class or series
274. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AT art. 5.141.
275. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT arts. 5.14J(1)(a), 5.14J(2).
276. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT arts. 5.14J(1)(b), 5.14J(2).
277. 1997 Tex. Laws 1542 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT arts. 5.14J(1)(c), 5.14J(2).
278. 1997 Tex. Laws 1543 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14K.
279. 1997 Tex. Laws 1543 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14L.
280. 1997 Tex. Laws 1543 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14L.
281. 1997 Tex. Laws 1533-35 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT arts. 5.01B(3), 5.02B(3).
282. 1997 Tex. Laws 1540 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art 5.11B(2). This result is
not immediately apparent on reading 5.11B(2). If the shareholder does receive different
consideration, the 5.11 denial of dissent is inapplicable and the 5.11A right to dissent does
apply.
283. 1997 Tex. Laws 1536 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.03H.
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received the same consideration (other than cash for fractional shares)
and received only NASDAQ Stock Market or NASD national market se-
curities.284 Prior law did not include NASDAQ or NASD national mar-
ket securities. Shareholder dissent rights in a sale of assets were denied
to shareholders who lacked the right to vote on the sale.285
Corporations obtained new authority to convert-with the shareholder
vote needed for a merger-to a domestic or foreign corporation or other
entity such as a partnership or LLC.286 Shareholders acquired interests in
the new entity as specified in the plan of conversion 287 and were pro-
tected from becoming personally liable for new entity obligations without
their consent. 288 Dissent and appraisal rights were the same as in a
merger.289 As noted later, similar conversion provisions were given to
general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies. Conver-
sion treated the new entity as a continuation of the old one2 90 and al-
lowed transformation of an entity without the formality of conveyance of
assets or the complexity of mergers. Representatives of the plaintiffs bar
were suspicious that liabilities could somehow be eliminated by conver-
sion but the statutes specified continuation of existing liabilities in the
new entity.2 91
Corporations and other entities were granted new flexibility to deal
with 90%-owned entities by merging into one or more of them, merging
one or more of them into itself or merging itself and any one or more of
them into any one or more of them.2 92 No shareholder, owner or member
vote was needed if the parent entity survived.2 93 No shareholder vote
was needed in a corporation that was a party to a merger agreement but
not a party to the merger.2 94 This applied to triangular merger or reor-
ganization plan by which a company merged with a subsidiary of a corpo-
ration pursuant to an agreement among all three companies.
An anti-takeover Business Combination Law295 similar to Delaware's
was added to the TBCA in 1997 on the persuasiveness and persistence of
Byron F. Egan. In essence it delayed for three years any corporation's
merger, asset sale or similar transaction with a person who became a 20%
shareholder (or that person's affiliate) without permission of the corpora-
tion's board of directors.296 There was an exception if the transaction was
approved by at least two thirds of shares not owned by 20% share-
284. 1997 Tex. Laws 1540 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.11B.
285. 1997 Tex. Laws 1540 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.11A(2).
286. 1997 Tex. Laws 1546-47 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.17.
287. 1997 Tex. Laws 15449-50 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.20A(6).
288. 1997 Tex. Laws 1546 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 5.17A(4).
289. 1997 Tex. Laws 1548-49 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art.5.20A(9).
290. 1997 Tex. Laws 1548 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.20A(1).
291. 1997 Tex. Laws 1548 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 5.20A(3).
292. 1997 Tex. Laws 1544 amending TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.16A.
293. Id.
294. 1997 Tex. Laws 1535 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.03A.
295. 1997 Tex. Laws 1556-59 adding TEx. Bus. CORP. Ac-T arts. 13.01-13.08.
296. 1997 Tex. Laws 1558 adding TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 13.03A(1).
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holder.297 Directors, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
could consider both the long term and short term interests of the corpora-
tion including the possibility that those interests might be best served by
continued independence of the corporation.298 Another anti-takeover
amendment required cause for removal of directors on a classified
board.299
Among numerous other changes, shareholder approval was measured
by a majority of shares entitled to vote that either voted or expressly
abstained. Thus broker non-votes-shares held in street name by brokers
that abstained because they could not vote without owner instruction-
would not increase the number of votes needed for approval.300 A further
effort to avoid piercing the corporate veil extended protection beyond
shareholders to affiliates of shareholders or of the corporation,30 1 and to
tort-type claims "relating to or arising from" contractual obligations. 302
Failure to follow corporate formalities was denied as a basis for holding
shareholders liable for any corporate obligation, not just for corporate
contractual obligations. 30 3
Power-altering shareholder agreements of the kind that had previously
been permitted only for close corporations30 4 were allowed for all for cor-
porations whose shares were not publicly traded if unanimously approved
by shareholders. These agreements could, among other things, restrict
the discretion or power of the board of directors, eliminate the board and
permit shareholder management, prescribe who should be directors or
officers and their compensation, govern distributions, allocate voting
power of shares and directors, set terms of conflict of interest transactions
and specify various means of dissolution.30 5 Conflict of interest transac-
tions-between the corporation and its director of officers-if otherwise
valid-were validated if approved by disinterested directors or board
committee after disclosure of material facts, if approved by shareholders
after disclosure of material facts, or if fair to the corporation.306 Under
prior law, conflict transactions were not void or voidable merely because
the officer or director participated in their approval if there was disinter-
ested or shareholder approval or fairness. As noted earlier in connection
with derivative suits, "disinterested" has a special statutory definition.
The companion word "independent" is not used in the validation section.
Professional corporation shareholders as* such were relieved of duty to
supervise corporate officers or employee in performance of their duties
and were declared to have no greater liability than shareholders of other
297. 1997 Tex. Laws 1558 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 13.03A(2).
298. 1997 Tex. Laws 1559 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 13.06.
299. 1997 Tex. Laws 1526 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.32C.
300. 1997 Tex. Laws 1523 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.28B.
301. 1997 Tex. Laws 1522 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.21A.
302. 1997 Tex. Laws 1522 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.21A(2).
303. 1997 Tex. Laws 1522-23 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.21A(3).
304. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 12.32.
305. 1997 Tex. Laws 1524-26 adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.30-1.
306. 1997 Tex. Laws 1527 amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Act art. 2.35-1.
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business corporations. 30 7
A little-used species of business organization revived in 1983 and 1989.
The Texas Real Estate Investment Trust Act was passed in 1961308 to
accommodate organizations which had special federal income tax bene-
fits. Amendments30 9 completely recast it in a pattern very close to the
Business Corporation Act.
One of the themes of business legislation in the last two decades of the
20th century was to harmonize the several kinds of structures by elimi-
nating historical differences that made sense when the structures were
first authorized. A comprehensive and brilliant job of this was headed by
Daryl Robertson. It resulted in a massive Bill that failed to pass in 1999
and again in 2001,310 partly because of its sheer length (and resulting un-
certainty about just what was in it) and partly because of opposition from
the plaintiffs' bar.
4.2 LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (LLCs)
Limited Liability Companies ("LLCs") came into Texas law in 1991 by
the passage of a complete statute patterned partly on the TBCA and oth-
erwise on TRLPA's limited partnership features designed to achieve taxa-
tion as a partnership rather than a corporation.311 Matters not covered by
the statute were governed by the TBCA and the Miscellaneous Corpora-
tion Laws Act. 312 Texas was among the first to authorize this potentially
attractive form of organization, Although Wyoming and Florida were the
first, the Texas law followed Colorado's statute more closely. To permit
greater contractual flexibility, the LLC Act contained no fiduciary duty
provisions. LLCs were subjected to corporate franchise tax313 as a result
of a fiscal note from the Legislative Budget Board stating that substantial
state revenue would otherwise be lost. For this reason limited partner-
ships (which are not subject to franchise tax) continue to be used for
many businesses that could benefit from the more flexible LLC struc-
tures. 1993 amendments authorized professional LLCs for doctors and
others.314 1997 amendments freed LLCs from TBCA-type limitations on
indemnification and insurance of directors and officers315 and made clear
that any otherwise existing fiduciary or other duties could be expanded or
restricted by the regulations. 316 LLCs acquired new flexibility by adding
that various regulatory provisions various regulatory provisions which
307. 1991 Tex. Laws 3217 amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 1528e § 5.
308. 1961 Tex. Laws ch. 384.
309. 1989 Tex. Laws 3652-62 ch. 801 §§ 67-77 with later amendments by 1995 Tex. Laws
ch. 234 § 1.
310. H.B. 2681, 76th Leg. (1999); H.B. 327, 77th Leg. (2001).
311. 1.991 Tex. Laws 3192-3216 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n.
312. 1991 Tex. Laws 3215 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.1528n art. 8.12.
313. 1991 Tex. Laws 3218 amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Tax Code § 17.001.
314. 1993 Tex. Laws 430-48 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.1528n art.11.01-
11.07.
315. 1997 Tex. Laws 1565 amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1528n art. 2.20A.
316. 1997 Tex. Laws 1565 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 1528n art. 2.20B.
[Vol. 55
TWO CENTURIES OF DEVELOPMENT
could be altered by the charter could also be altered by the regulations.
LLCs also took on new conformity with corporations by a number of
amendments mimicking TBCA sections, including authority for conver-
sion to other forms of entity.317
4.3 PARTNERSHIPS
(1) Limited Partnerships
The Texas Revised Limited Partnership act (TRLPA) became law in
1987. This modernization of the prior statute was the work of the Bar
Partnership Committee. It had two major aims. One was to accommodate
the complexity of limited partnerships that evolved while so many were
being used for tax-oriented deals. The other major aim was to give limited
partner investors increased protection. In both these aims the Act drew
heavily from the then recently revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act 318 and Delaware's statute,319 as noted by the State Bar Partnership
Committee which drafted the statute and supplied comments on each sec-
tion.320 Following the pattern set by the Texas Business Corporation Act,
the partnership statute was to become effective five years later unless
adopted sooner by a firm desiring its benefits.3 21
Flexibility came primarily by giving the partnership agreement even
more the pivotal role in a partnership in carefully graded ways. The stress
on the agreement as the governing document diminished the role of the
limited partnership certificate as a publicly filed document whose content
was greatly reduced. The agreement directly governs matters like rights
of and restrictions on general partners322 and admissions of limited part-
ners.323 A number of issues are governed by statute unless otherwise
provided in the partnership agreement, e.g., assignability of partnership
interests,324 nondissolution by assignment of an interest,325enforceability
of limited partner contributions,326 and release of obligation to make con-
tributions or return improper distributions.327 The partnership agreement
can be oral,328 as it is in many informal partnerships. Some important
matters are governed only by a written agreement: allocation of profits
and losses,329 sharing of distributions,330 creation of classes or groups of
317. 1997 Tex. Laws 1373 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 1518n art. 10.08.
318. 6A UNIF. STATE LAWS ANN. 1-304 (1985).
319. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 17-101 - 17-1108 (1985).
320. 17 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 12 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2001).
321. 1987 Tex. Laws 120-21 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 13.02..
322. 1987 Tex. Laws 107 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 4.03(a).
323. 1987 Tex. Laws 103 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 3.01(b).
324. 1987 Tex. Laws 110 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 7.02(a)(1).
325. 1987 Tex. Laws 110 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 7.02(a)(2).
326. 1987 Tex. Laws 107-08 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 5.02(b).
327. 1987 Tex. Laws 108 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 5.02(d).
328. 1987 Tex. Laws 92 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 1.02(9).
329. 1987 Tex. Laws 108 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 5.03.
330. 1987 Tex. Laws 108 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 5.04.
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partners with different rights,331 indemnification of general partners,332
admission of general partners 333 and withdrawal rights of limited part-
ners. 334 Without a written agreement, the statute controls those matters.
The partnership agreement can be amended by whatever provisions it has
for amendment, or if there are none, by unanimous consent. Flexibility
came also by permitting limited partnerships to merge with one or more
domestic or foreign limited partnerships-later expanded to include
other entities such as corporations or limited liability companies.335
Protection for limited partners arrived by statutory authority to bring
derivative suits, 336 e.g., against general partners for violation of fiduciary
duty. This authority lacked the statutory obstacles later applied to corpo-
rate derivative suits. 337 Limited partners were allowed expanded powers,
if the partnership agreement so provided, to monitor the general part-
ner's management, by voting on borrowing, sale of assets, removal and
replacement of the general partner and various other actions of the gen-
eral partner.338 They could enjoy these powers without becoming liable
for partnership obligations they would otherwise incur by participating in
control of the firm.339 If a limited partner did participate in control, as
more narrowly defined, she was liable only to third parties doing busi-
ness with the partnership reasonably believing, based on the limited part-
ner's conduct, that the limited partner was a general partner. 340 A
limited partner who also lent money to the partnership could take a se-
curity interest.34'
Flexibility for limited partners came by allowing them to make their
required contributions not only in cash but also in property, services,
promissory notes or promises of future cash or property.342
The entity character of general partnerships was already recognized. 343
The 1987 act made it even more pronounced, more corporate-like, for
limited partnerships. Limited partners are, with rare exceptions, not lia-
ble for partnership obligations. 344 Neither kind of partner has rights in
331. 1987 Tex. Laws 103, 107 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 §§ 3.02,
4.05.
332. 1987 Tex. Laws 117 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 11.02.
333. 1987 Tex. Laws 106 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 4.01(a).
334. 1987 Tex. Laws 109 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 6.03.
335. 1987 Tex. Laws 101-02 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 2.11.
Later amendments included radical mergers and interest exchanges like those for corpora-
tions. 1991 Tex. Laws 322-26 amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 2.11 and
adding § 2.11(h).
336. 1987 Tex. Laws 115-16 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 §§ 10.01-
10.05.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 253-72.
338. 1987 Tex. Laws 103-04 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 3.03(b).
339. 1987 Tex. Laws 103-04 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 3.03(b).
340. 1987 Tex. Laws 103 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 3.03(a).
341. 1987 Tex. Laws 97 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 1.10.
342. 1987 Tex. Laws 107-08 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 §§ 1.02(2),
5.01, 5.02.
343. Haney v. Henley, Bate, Deaton & Porter, 618 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1981).
344. 338. 1.987 Tex. Laws 103 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 3.01(a).
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partnership property. 345 Either kind may do business with the firm as if
they were strangers. 346 Judicial process may be served on the firm
through a general partner, a registered agent or (in some cases) the Sec-
retary of State.347 Changes of limited partners and (in some instances)
general partners may occur without dissolution of the firm.348 Reconsti-
tution is permitted after some kinds of dissolution.349 Indemnification
standards for general partners are supplied.350 Reorganization and merg-
ers are permitted 351-all very much as in corporations. But the drafters
took care not to provide so much "continuity of interest" that the part-
nership would be treated as a corporation under then prevailing federal
income tax law. This was achieved by formally recognizing dissolution352
on an event of withdrawal of a general partner-broadly defined to in-
clude bankruptcy, death and other occurrences 353-but functionally per-
mitting continuation by reconstitution. 354
TRLPA was not a complete code of partnership law. Like its predeces-
sor, it relies on-or is linked to-the general partnership statute and
common law for matters like fiduciary duty not explicitly covered by
TRLPA355
Limited partnerships acquired new flexibility with the right to convert
into other entities in 1997.356 Limited partners lost flexibility by deletion
of the right to withdraw on 6 months notice if the agreement had no with-
drawal provision and no specified time or event for dissolution.357 Inabil-
ity of limited partners to withdraw facilitated discounted values of family
limited partnerships for federal gift and estate taxes. Estate planners
urged this amendment. Some Bar Committee members were concerned
about other effects of the resulting lock-in but recognized that withdrawal
rights could be included in the partnership agreement if desired.
The check-the-box tax regulations 358 allowed most non-corporate enti-
ties to choose whether to be taxed as partnerships or as corporations. This
relieved state law from prescribing easy events of dissolution that prior
tax regulations required for partnership treatment. Texas responded by
denying dissolution on an event of withdrawal of a general partner if the
345. 1987 Tex. Laws 110 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 7.01.
346. 1987 Tex. Laws 97 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 1.10.
347. 1987 Tex. Laws 96-97, 115 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 §§ 1.08,
9.10.
348. 1987 Tex. Laws 103, 106, 109 110, 111 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art,
6132a-1 §§ 3.01, 4.01, 4.02, 6.03, 7.02, 7.04.
349. 1987 Tex. Laws 112 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 8.03.
350. 1987 Tex. Laws 116-20 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 §§ 11.01-
11.20.
351. 1987 Tex. Laws 99-100 , 101,adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1
§§ 2.06, 2.11.
352. 1987 Tex. Laws 110-11 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 8.01(3).
353. 1987 Tex. Laws 107-08 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 4.02.
354. 1987 Tex. Laws 112 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 8.03.
355. 1987 Tex. Laws 121 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132a-1 § 13.03.
356. 1997 Tex. Laws 1585-88 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 § 2.15.
357. 1997 Tex. Laws 1589 amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 § 6.03.
358. Income Tax Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1996).
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business carried on with a remaining general partner pursuant to the
agreement or if the proportion of partners specified by the agreement
carried on the business and appointed a new general partner if none was
left.35 9 That year there were two new grounds for judicial dissolution: ec-
onomic purpose likely to be unreasonably frustrated or partner's conduct
making it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with that
partner.360
(2) General Partnerships
Nineteen ninety-one brought the possibility of general partnerships be-
coming limited liability partnerships (LLPs) as discussed in Part 4.3(3)
below. Nineteen ninety-three produced a new statute for general partner-
ships-Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA), designed to modernize
the prior statute. TRPA was drafted by the same State Bar Committee
that wrote TRLPA. It too drew heavily on Delaware and a Uniform Act.
It gave open-ended protection to partners by specifying that a partner
owes a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. and the duty of loyalty includes
accounting for personal benefit derived by the partner in the conduct of
the partnership or use of partnership property, refraining from dealing
adversely to or competing with the partnership 361 The national act is
more restrictive in two ways: it states that the only fiduciary duties a part-
ner owes are loyalty and care and that the duty of loyalty is limited to the
actions in the Texas statute. 362 Delaware followed the national act.363
Thus Texas was left to develop its considerable body of partnership fidu-
ciary law 364 with a statutory overlay of a good faith obligation in perform-
ing the specified duties.365 But it was mandated that a partner's loyalty
duty is not as extensive as that of a trustee366 and that she does not vio-
late the loyalty duty merely because she furthers her own interests.367
And the Act grants a partner's right to information about the firm only
"on request and to the extent just and reasonable." 368
In 1993 Partners were given some additional protection from liability
for partnership obligations. When the partner was liable, a judgment
could be collected against his assets only after partnership assets were
359. 1997 Tex. Laws 1590 amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6132a-1 § 8.01(3).
360. 1997 Tex. Laws 1590 amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6132a-1 §§ 8.02(1),
8.02(2).
361. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132b-4.04(a), 6132b-
4.04(b).
362. Uniform Partnership Act (1996), 6A Unif. Laws Ann. § 4.04(a), 4.04(b)
363. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 15-404.
364. E.g., Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976); Johnson v Peckham, 120
S.W.2d. 786 (Tex. 1938); Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ refused n.r.e); Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, writ refused n.r.e.).
365. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Arts, 6132b-4.04(d)(1).
366. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.04(f).
367. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.04(e).
368. 1993 Tex. Laws 3897-98 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.03(c).
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exhausted.369 Fiduciary duty in the formation of a partnership was elimi-
nated on the theory that potential partners are then negotiating at arms
length. The duty was limited to the operation and liquidation phases of
the partnership. 370
The 1993 statute for the first time explicitly recognized the partnership
as an entity37 1 and prescribed that partner could sue partnership and vice
versa.372 The Act implied that an accounting is unnecessary to a suit be-
tween partners and partnerships.373 Later amendments made this ex-
plicit.374 The Act retained the prior definition of a partnership as an
association of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit but
added that the same definition applies to a joint venture, indicating that
joint ventures are in law the same as partnerships. 375 Codifying a good
deal of case law, the new act specified a number of factors indicating that
a relationship is a partnership 376 and a number indicating the opposite.377
No relative weights attach to the factors but the Bar Committee notes
that sharing of profits and of control will probably continue to be the
most important.378 Another first allowed the partners to choose to be
governed by the law of any state-for example Delaware-if that state
bears a reasonable relation to the partners or the partnership business.379
While retaining the primacy of the partnership agreement, 380 the Act
spelled out certain provisions that may not be varied by agreement.381
But it allowed most of them to be modified in prescribed ways. Thus
partners may not eliminate the duty of loyalty but may agree that specific
activities do not violate the duty if not manifestly unreasonable. 38 2 They
may not eliminate the duty of care or the obligation of good faith but may
determine the standards for measuring the performance of the duty or
obligation if not manifestly unreasonable.383 How these limitations will
be construed remains to be seen.
TRPA changed the language and consequences of dissolution to give
more continuity to the partnership entity. "Dissolution," which had often
been confused with termination, did not appear in the vocabulary of
TRPA. "Event of withdrawal" took its place, defined to include a part-
369. 1993 Tex. Laws 3893 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-3.05(d).
370. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.04(b)(1), (c).
371. 1993 Tex. Laws 3890 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-2,01.
372. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.06.
373. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898-99 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.06(b).
374. 1997 Tex. Laws 1596 amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-4.06(b).
375. 1993 Tex. Laws 3890 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-2.02(a).
376. 1993 Tex. Laws 3890 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-2.03(a).
377. 1993 Tex. Laws 3890-91 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-2.03(b).
378. Comment of Bar Committee -1993, 17 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 177 (Supp.
2001)
379. 1993 Tex. Laws 3889 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-1.05.
380. 1993 Tex. Laws 3889 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-1.03(a).
381. 1993 Tex. Laws 3889 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-1.03(b).
382. 1993 Tex. Laws 3898 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-1.03(b)(2).




ner's "I withdraw" sort of statement and also a partner's death, bank-
ruptcy, expulsion, incapacity and other disabling circumstances. 38 4 An
event of withdrawal typically leads not to winding up and termination of
the firm but to buyout (redemption) of the withdrawn partner's interest
at fair value385 and continuation of the firm with the remaining partners.
But the event of withdrawal requires winding up of the firm on specified
occurrences. These include the express will of a majority in interest of the
partners (if the partnership is not for a definite term, i.e. one "at will" in
prior terminology), 386 the express will of all the partners (if the partner-
ship is for a definite term or project), 387 illegality of continuation, 388 and
sale of substantially all assets.389 An individual partner can avoid the
lock-in effect of these continuity provisions if he can persuade a court to
hold that the economic purpose of the firm is likely to be unreasonably
frustrated,390 a partner's conduct makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on business with that partner,391 or it is not otherwise reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership
agreement. 392 A partnership is terminated, as under prior law, only when
winding up is completed. 393
To facilitate transformation of business structures, TRPA allowed gen-
eral partnerships to convert to limited partnerships and later to other en-
tities or vice versa on consent of a majority in interest of the partners.394
To protect a limited partner for becoming liable as a general partner with-
out her consent, she is considered withdrawn unless she agrees in 60 days
to remain a partner.395 In similar vein, both general and limited partner-
ships became able to merge with one or more domestic or foreign general
and limited partnerships and other entities, e.g., limited liability compa-
nies and corporations on approval as provided in the partnership agree-
ment.396 Partner's interests could be changed into a wide variety of other
kinds of interests in the resulting entities397 but a partner could not be
subjected to new liabilities without his consent.398 Interest exchanges be-
tween partnerships and other entities were authorized.399
384. 1993 Tex. Laws 3900 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-6.01.
385. 1993 Tex. Laws 3901 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-7.01.
386. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132-8.01(a).
387. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(b).
388. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(d).
389. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(f).
390. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(e)(1).
391. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(e)(2).
392. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.01(e)(3).
393. 1993 Tex. Laws 3905 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-8.02.
394. 1993 Tex. Laws 3907-08 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-9.01
amended in 1997 when id. § 9.05 was added.
395. 1993 Tex. Laws 3907-08 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-9.01(b).
396. 1993 Tex. Laws 3908-11, 3912 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Arts., 6132b-
9.02(a), 6132b-9.04. § 9.02 was amended in 1997.
397. 1993 Tex. Laws 3908-09 adding TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-9.02(b).
398. 1993 Tex. Laws 3910 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-9.02(g)(9).
399. 1993 Tex. Laws 3911 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art, 6132b-9.03, later
amended by 1997.1601-02.
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Following the pattern set by the Business Corporation Act and
TRLPA, the general partnership statute was to become effective five
years later unless adopted sooner by a firm desiring its benefits. 40 0 On the
same pattern, TRPA became the supplemental law or linkage for limited
partnerships after five years unless they adopted it sooner.
40 1
Key figures in the development of partnership statutes were Steven A.
Waters and W. Alan Kailer who chaired the Bar Committee at different
times.
(3) Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs)
Nineteen ninety-one brought the possibility of general partnerships be-
coming limited liability partnerships (LLPs). LLPs were still general part-
nerships but eliminated vicarious liability of one partner for the torts of
another. More specifically, this dispensed with the traditional joint and
several liability of partners for partnership obligations, but only for those
obligations arising from torts rather than from contracts. The idea came
from Lubbock lawyers James H. Milam, Philip W. Johnson and Robert L.
Duncan who were concerned about pending government suits against
lawyers who had not represented failed savings and loan associations-of
which there were then many-but whose partners had represented them.
Their Senator offered a short bill stating that a partner in a professional
firm is not liable for misconduct in rendering a professional service by
another partner or employee. The Senate passed the Bill without much
comment. In the House it was criticized on several grounds. These in-
cluded covering only professionals (particularly lawyers), relieving pro-
fessionals from responsibility for persons they supervised, failing to signal
persons dealing with the partnership that familiar partner liability was
missing and leaving injured parties with no source of recovery. Represen-
tative Steve Wolens asked me as one of the critics to redraft the Bill in
response to these comments. My redraft included input from Byron F.
Egan, Larry Schoenbrun and Robert Hamilton. It was open to all kinds
of partnerships, denied partners protection from liability of persons they
supervised or directed, required LLPs to register annually with the Secre-
tary of State and include "LLP" as part of their firm name, and carry at
least $100,000 of liability insurance covering the specified conduct. In that
form it quickly passed and became law.40 2
The LLP concept was popular and widely used. 40 3 Louisiana, the Dis-
400. 1993 Tex. Laws 3912 adding TEX. REV. Civ. S'rAT. ANN. Art. 6132b-10.03, later
renumbered 11.03.
401. 1993 Tex. Laws 3914-15 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 6132a-1 § 13.03.
402. 1991 Tex, Laws 3234-35 amending Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b § 15 and adding
§§ 45-A, 45-B and 45-C.
403. See, e.g., R. Dennis Anderson, Alan R. Bromberg, Byron F. Egan, Campbell A.
Griffin, Larry L. Schoenbrun & Charles Szalkowski, Registered LLPs, 55 TEX. B.J. 728
(1992); Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present At the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1995); Sue Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield
of Unintended Consequences- The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 717 (1997); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIB-
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trict of Columbia adopted or modified it in 1993 and within a few years
and with support from large accounting firms every state passed some
version of it. Texas later refined and expanded its coverage to "full
shield" by including protection of partners from partnership contract lia-
bility as well as tort liability.404 This occurred after a number of other
states did so.
The LLP provisions were carried forward in TRPA when it was passed
in 1993.405
4.4 SECURITIES
In the 1980s and 1990s the rigidity of Texas securities law loosened in
important respects, largely through the creation or expansion of exemp-
tions via State Securities Board rule-making authority. 406 In part this was
response to the 1983 amendment allowing the Securities Act to be con-
strued "to encourage capital formation ... and to minimize regulatory
burdens on issuers. '40 7 Other significant factors were the increasing flexi-
bility of Securities Commissioners Richard D. Latham , then Denise
Voigt Crawford, and the persuasiveness of James R. Peacock III and
others on the State Bar of Texas Committee on Securities.
Issuers of securities gained the flexibility of ULOE, the Uniform Lim-
ited Offering Exemption 40 8 which initially permitted unregistered offers
and sales-but without "general advertising"-in coordination with fed-
eral Regulation D:40 9
- Up to $500,000 to unlimited numbers of investors with no disclosure
requirements,
- Up to $5,000,000 to unlimited accredited investors and maximum 35
nonaccredited investors with modest disclosure requirements if there
were any unaccredited buyers, and
- Over $5,000,000 to unlimited accredited investors with registration-
equivalent disclosure.
The securities were restricted as to resale and general solicitation was
forbidden. Issuers gained also the ability to sell without securities regis-
tration-but with some advertising-to expanded classes of institu-
STEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
Acr (2001).
404. 1997 Tex. Laws 1594-95 amending TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 3.08(a)(1) to
provide for nonliability for "debts and obligations of the partnership" with an exception in
§ 3.08(a)(2) if the partner was directly involved in the specific activity in which the miscon-
duct occurred or had notice of the misconduct and did not take reasonable steps to prevent
or cure it.
405. 1993 Tex. Laws 3894-96 adding TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. Art. 6132b-3.08.
406. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art.581-5T.
407. 1983 Tex. Laws 2716 § 3, now TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 581-10-1; see supra text
accompanying note 192.
408. Reg. 109.13(k), 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.13(k), 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.
55,563.
409. Securities and Exchange Commission Rules 501-506, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506
as originally issued in Securities Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982), 24 S.E.C. Docket
1166 (1982).
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tiona 410 and accredited 411 investors. Accredited investors are primarily
financial institutions, trusts or partnerships with $5,000,000 of assets, and
natural persons with $1,000,000 of net worth or $200,000 of income (or
$300,000 joint income with spouse) in the two most recent years. 412
Texas-registered dealers were permitted to use the Internet for general
advertising of their products and services-but without efforts to sell and
subject to other conditions. 413 The reach of the Internet was recognized
further in letting non-Texas dealers (therefore typically unregistered
here) make offers on the Internet if they state that securities are not be-
ing offered for sale to anyone in Texas and no sale is made in Texas. 414
Buyers of unregistered securities gained significant ability to resell
without registration in modest amounts (15 sales in 12 months in addition
to sales under certain other exemptions). 41 5 They also gained significant
ability to resell without registration after a reasonable one-year holding
period 416 by compliance with SEC Rule 144.417
While registration requirements were loosened, enforcement was tight-
ened somewhat. The 1995 amendments gave the Commissioner new au-
thority to impose administrative fines for violation of the Securities Act
in amounts up to $10,000 per violation (maximum $100,000 for multiple
violations in a single proceeding or series of related proceedings)418 and
expanded authority to revoke or suspend registration, e.g. because of dis-
ciplinary action by another regulatory agency. 419 The fines were fre-
quently imposed in administrative orders to sanction lesser violations,
although not all orders impose fines. Criminal enforcement continued to
have primary emphasis, and recent statistics show the state is generally
recognized to obtain more criminal convictions for securities violations
than any other state and possibly than all other states combined:
410. Reg. 109.3, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.3, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. [ 55,553 (quali-
fied institutional buyers).
411. Reg. 109.3, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.3, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 55,553; Reg.
109.13(k), 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.13(k), 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.; Reg. 139.16, 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 139.16, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. $ 55,720E ( "limited use advertisements"
allowed).
412. 406. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 501(a),17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a).
413. Reg. 139.18, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.18, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. I 55,720G.
414. Reg. 139.17, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.17, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. I 55,720F
415. Reg. 139.14, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.14, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 55,720C
(15 sales in 12 months in addition to sales under certain other exemptions).
416. Reg. 139.13, 7 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.13, 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 55,720B.
417. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Other re-
quirements include current public information about the issuer of the security, limits on
amounts sold in 3 months (generally equal to one week's trading volume) unless held for 2
years, and required sale in brokers' transactions. The holding period was originally two
years.
418. 1995 Tex. Laws 1995, § 13 adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581 § 23-1 .
419. 1995 Tex. Law 1992-93 § 9 amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-14.
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Commissions were allowed to be collected by unregistered persons in
transactions exempted by rule (previously only those exempted by statute
were covered) but securities exempt by statute (e.g., government securi-
ties) no longer allowed commissions by unregistered persons.420
NSMIA (The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996)
preempted a large part of state securities law. It forbade states to register
securities of federally registered investment companies and securities
listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges or the NASDAQ
National Market System421 ("covered securities"). 422 This preemption
had little effect in Texas because most of those securities were already
exempted by Texas statute or rule. The major exception was investment
companies (mutual funds) which Texas regularly had required to register.
Their fees had supplied a substantial part of the Board's revenue but
NSMIA allowed continuation of state fees. 423
NSMIA prohibited state "merit" regulation with respect to covered se-
curities 42 4 but left it intact for securities not "covered," e.g. those of com-
panies making their first public offering. NSMIA contained a national
exemption for sales to "qualified buyers" 425 as SEC defined that phrase
but SEC has not yet defined it. NSMIA also preempted a number of ex-
emptions including those for broker,426 dealer,427 non-issuer, 42 non-un-
derwriter 42 9 and nonpublic430 transactions. At the same time it
preempted a number of kinds of regulations of broker-dealers. 431 But it
preserved state authority to investigate and prosecute for fraud and for
unlawful broker-dealer conduct. 432
2001 legislation originated largely from Securities Board staff in con-
420. 1995 Tex. Law 1997-98 amending TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art, 581-34.
421. SECURITIES ACT §§ 18(a)(1), 18(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.§§ 77r(a)(1), 77r(b)(1)-(2).
422. SECURITIES AC §§ 18(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(c)(2.
423. SECURITIES ACT §§ 18(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.§ § 77r(c)(2)(B).
424. SECURITIES ACT § 18(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. 77r(a)(3).
425. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (b)(3)
426. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(4)(B) referring to id. § 4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(B),
referring to id. § 77d(4).
427. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(4)(A) referring to id. § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(A),
referring to id. § 77d(3).
428. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(4)(A) referring to id. § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(A),
referring to id. § 77d(1).
429. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(4)(A) referring to id. § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(a), re-
ferring to id. § 4(1).
430. SECURITIES ACT § 18(b)(4)(D) referring to SEC rules under id. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b)(4)(D), referring to SEC rules under id. § 77d(2).
431. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT § 15(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(h).
432. SECURITIES ACT § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1).
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nection with Sunset Review433 and highlighted enforcement. The Com-
missioner and staff gained rights to inspect brokers and their records
without notice,434 to issue cease-desist orders against fraudulent prac-
tices,435 and to issue cease-desist orders without notice or hearing in
emergency situations.436 Criminal prosecutions of corporations and as-
sociations for Securities Act violations was authorized for the first time. If
the violation was by a person acting within scope and authorized or reck-
lessly tolerated by a majority of the governing board or by a high mana-
gerial agent within his or her authority. 437 There is a defense if the high
managerial agent with responsibility exercised due diligence to prevent
the violation. 438
In contrast to increased remedies for the Commissioner and the State,
a defrauded buyer's damages remedy was reduced if the buyer disposed
of the security for less than its value. Her measure of damages is the price
she paid (plus legal interest) less the greater of the value at disposition or
the actual consideration she received. 439 A new remedy was added for the
defrauded client of an investment adviser,440 similar to that for a de-
frauded buyer or seller of a security.
Investment advisers had long been included in the Texas definition of
"dealer" and so registered and regulated without recognition of profes-
sional differences from dealers. Federal law had registered and regulated
advisers separately from dealers (and brokers) since 1940. As part of the
1996 NSMIA federal preemption of a large part of state securities regula-
tion, states were barred from requiring registration of large investment
advisers i.e. those having under management at least $25,000,000 or more
per SEC rule.441 SEC reset that amount at $30,000,000.442 New or revised
Texas sections in 2001 defined investment advisers and subjected them to
registration, regulation and liability much like dealers.443 In comity with
the federal law, federally registered advisers were allowed to do Texas
business with a notice filing in lieu of registration.444 The Texas invest-
433. Sunset Advisory Commission, State Securities Board Sunset Staff Report (2000).
434. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art.581-13-1.
435. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Arts 581-23.
436. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. A Arts 581-23-2.
437. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Arts 581-29-3.
438. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Arts 581-29-3(c).
439. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Arts 581-33D(3). In either case, income received on
the security is deducted from the damages measure.
440. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Arts 581-33-1.
441. Investment Advisers Act § 203A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1) barring state re-
gistration of advisers registered under id § 203. Id § 203A(a)(1) generally bars § 203 regis-
tration of advisers with less than $25,000,000 of assets under management. There is an
exception for an adviser whose home state (where it has its principal office and place of
business) regulates it as an adviser.
442. Investment Advisers Act Rule 203A-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1.
443. E.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-4N, -8, -1, -12B, -12-1, -13, -13-1, -14, -17,
-18, -20, -21, -23B, -23-1, -25, -33-1.
444. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-12-1.
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ment adviser definition 445 closely repeated the federal definition.446 But
Texas did not copy the federal exemption for very-small advisers - those
with fewer than 15 clients in 12 months.447 The industry longed for this
exemption in Texas but Commissioner and staff opposed it. While states
from were barred from requiring registration of federally registered in-
vestment advisers, a state was allowed to require registration of an in-
vestment adviser representative who has a place of business located
within that state.448 Texas required registration of adviser representa-
tives. 449
The 2001 amendments enlarged the three-member State Securities
Board to five, directed it to make and implement policies separating its
policing making responsibility from the management responsibility of the
Commission and employees and made the Board similar to other state
agencies in various respects .450
In a considerable departure from regulation and enforcement, a novel
and promising section directed the Commissioner to "develop and imple-
ment investor education initiatives to inform the public about the basics
of investing in securities, with a special emphasis placed on the preven-
tion and detection of securities fraud."'451
5. SOME OBSERVATIONS
Nineteenth century hostility to large organizations and capital accumu-
lations has given way to a recognition of their necessity in an increasingly
complex and interrelated society. Nineteenth century insistence on per-
sonal liability has given way to a recognition of the role of financier risk
in encouraging enterprise. The securities law barriers to access to public
investors have moderated.
Texas was slow in developing its business organization laws. The pace
quickened in the last half of the 20th century and accelerated rapidly in
the last two decades of that period. In the main, the state has been a
follower, not a leader in this kind of legislation. Notable exceptions in-
clude its authorization of radical multi-party, multi-survivor mergers, 452
its allowance of easy conversion from one kind of entity to another,453
and its innovation of LLPs without partner liability for partnership obli-
gations (initially for those arising from another's conduct).454 As a fol-
lower, its models have usually been Uniform Acts, which have a degree
445. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-4N.
446. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
447. Investment Advisers Act § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c).
448. Investment Advisers Act § 203A(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1)(A).
449. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-12B.
450. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Arts. 581-2, -2-1, -2-2, -2-3, -2-4, -2-5, 2-5, -2-6, -2-7, -2-
8.
451. H.B. No. 2255, 79th Leg. Reg. Sess., 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. § 1.03 adding TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-43.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85, 316, 350-88.
454. See supra text accompanying notes Part 4.3(3).
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of national consensus, or Delaware, which is most responsive to business
needs. Potent influences have been the federal tax laws.455
Business law generally responds to business needs, and business needs
are usually for flexibility. At least since the 1950s, the prime interpreters
of those needs and the initiators of change have been the Committees of
the State Bar Business Law Section (formerly the Section on Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law). Their work has been careful, thoughtful
and competent. Their members have been experienced in the subject of
their work. The experience was gained largely in law firms representing
businesses. Their orientation was naturally pro-management. The overall
trend of Texas business law has been toward greater flexibility of struc-
ture and greater freedom of contract. Flexibility from a management
point of view has a price in diminished rights of and protections for share-
holders and investors.
455. Market factors include taxation, which has had its impact. See Alan R. Bromberg,
Tax Influences on the Law of Business Associations, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 327 (1964).
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